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ALMAE MATRIS CROATICAE ALUMNI

I'LL REMEMBER THESE TEARS



Published with **AMIA CROATICA** University of Zagreb

C R O A T I A

SPECIAL WAR ISSUE



GAUDEAMUS

EDITORIAL

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FROM MY POINT OF VIEW

At the time of which I write, the year 1991 at its close, the war in Croatia has achieved a level of violence and disaster that sets the tone for the new. The aggression against Croatia brought her into the war, and the country has sustained losses of shocking dimensions. If the tempo of destruction is allowed to continue in the way that the aggressor's thoughts and feelings seem to be moving now, it could lead to infinite degradation and terror.

It seems to me, that no words, no appeals, no protests could ever have had an ounce of weight. I realize now, that nothing we have done has served any useful purpose. The war is still going on.

The account of dead and living, has lost its authority and become meaningless. In the whispering misery of a school of skeletons, the honours - if that was the right word for so inhuman and treacherous a struggle - has been and will go to the enemy, unless we get an ally to rescue us at this crucial moment. Indeed, it might lead to a total disaster, the bloodiest so far. We should all be afraid to learn what the future holds.

Could the struggle of one nation for a better world, for freedom, the rule of law, an end to tyranny, the overthrow of evil, spread worldwide and trigger the beginning of World War III? I think that we should be aware that the seeds are planted and that in the spring of the new year, unless we have an inspiration for hope in abundant measure and some moral uplift, any silly mistake by the "big bosses" could trigger more widespread combat. They will go all out without caring what happens as long they do some kind of damage. But that would be a suicidal attack.

We have already experienced a vicious effort to conquer Croatian territories with the intention of exterminating the Croatian population. We must probably expect more of that sort of thing, and even worse, in the future.

The hope is only that international law might become strong again. The United Nations could perhaps secure a better world for everyone - freedom from fear. If one nation wants freedom and democracy while another desires war, the rest of the world should really join efforts to stop them. It is a very dangerous war going on in Croatia. It might be true that the war has been fought to end the whole range of boss tyranny - big bosses like Slobodan Milošević, little bosses like the foreman with the rough tongue. The moral issues sadly ring no bells at all!

Ladies and gentlemen, I feel extremely honoured and privileged to express my thanks to the writers of the articles, distinguished scholars, academics, prominent politicians and intellectuals all former students and graduates

of the University of Zagreb, for their enthusiastic response in recognizing the importance and key role of this issue of Gaudeamus.

All of us must realize how much we owe our Alma Mater for starting us on the road of our chosen profession.

The basic ideas and concepts that compose this issue are introduced within an intellectual framework to gain some sense and perspective on the vast changes in our history and the huge transformation from revolt against barbaric devastation to the dawn of a new era of the modern humane spirit which struggles to attain independence and freedom with dogged optimism, despite every reason for pessimism.

Croatia, my native country, is populated by people with aspirations for peace, pragmatic justice, freedom from arbitrary rule, and a decent life for their children.

I was born and educated in Dubrovnik, and I am a graduate of the University of Zagreb. Since the late-sixties I have lived in Toronto, Canada.

On August 4, 1991, I arrived in the city of Zagreb. The decision to stay was tough but it has given me an enormous thrill to see things coming through, together with the people with whom I shared my first grown-up experiences, and first confidence in the future.

Since then I have lived with and between ominous air raid sirens that give you the incredible sensation that all of sudden nothing is stable. There remains only the will to say to such weltering emotions "peace, be still".

The war in Croatia is still going on.

One day whenever it is, it will remind us of one example of historical misunderstanding; futility and the wastefulness of war will make us different persons.

Rina Obad Šlezić
Editor-in-Chief



Život je zaista čudan sklop okolnosti, u kojima neki nikad ne dobi-ju priliku, a neki je, kad im se i pruži, ne znaju iskoristiti — kaže Katarina Šlezić-Obad razmišljajući o svojim novinarskim počeci-ma.

Ta Kanadanka hrvatskog podrijetla velik dio života bavi-la se znanstvenim radom na Medicinskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Torontu. Nije bježala od izazova istraživa-nja u biokemiji, ali uvijek je čeznula za dinamičnim, kre-ativnim životom novinara. Iskrena, otvorena i vrlo iz-ravna osoba, Rina (kako želi da je se oslovljava) ne libi se priznati da je ulaz u novinar-stvo bila udaja za dobrostoje-ćeg liječnika. Ugodan život i sigurnost obitelji dali su joj priliku da se napokon posve-ti sebi, pronade sebe u novi-narstvu. Drugu priliku dale su joj demokratske promjene u Hrvatskoj i sve veće zani-manje matice zemlje za di-jasporu.

Kako je oduvijek bila »kon-tra svijeta«, i njezin dolazak u Hrvatsku zahvaćenu ra-tom nikoga, tko je poznaje, nije iznenadio. Rina je osta-vila muža i dvije kćeri u Ka-nadi, da bi kao ratni dopis-nik izvještavala za Hrvatski radio u Torontu. Znatizeljna, živa duha, prvih je dana uz-buna u Zagrebu željela sve osobno doživjeti, dokumenti-rati, pa je zamračenim ulica-ma lutala s videokamerom u ruci. No s vremenom je shva-tila da je to preopasno.

— Ipak sam sredovječna dama — ruga se Rina na vlastiti račun, želeći nam predočiti kako je životom u Kanadi stekla mogućnost da se nakon određenog broja godina bez ustezanja bavi onim što voli. — U Zagrebu sam već četiri mjeseca i mnogi me stari znanci, ali i novi koje sam stekla tražeći teme, često pitaju što ja tu zapravo radim. Valjda misle da mi je mjesto uz kućno og-njište, a meni se čini da je još toliko toga ispred mene i da je život tek počeo. Nekomu to možda cinično zvuči u ovim teškim vremenima patnje i razaranja, ali ovo što radim nije pustolovina, niti mislim da je presudno za sudbinu

KATARINA ŠLEZIĆ OBAD DUBROVNIK, TORONTO, ZAGREB

Rođena u Dubrovniku, afirmirala se u Torontu uređujući časopis Gaudeamus. ²
Danas je u Zagrebu, gdje izvještava za torontski Hrvatski radio. Poduzetna novinarka, o kojoj se u posljednje doba sve više priča, tako se odužuje domovini.

Hrvatske. Jednostavno želim biti svjedokom povijesnih zbivanja. Mnogo se govori o demokraciji, o njezinom ra-danju, a ja nisam sigurna da svi uopće razumiju o čemu je riječ. Promatrajući ljude za ovo vrijeme što sam u Zagre-bu, nisam nažalost zapazila da su shvatili kako ova tra-gedija nije isprika za odga-danje demokracije. Oko sebe vidim samo strah od patnji, razaranja, gladi i neizvjes-nosti i znam da ću nakraju morati otići s tim gorkim okusom u ustima, a to me najviše i boli — zdvojno go-vori Rina.

— Želimo li postati raz-mjerno razvijen, civiliziran narod, materijalno, duhovno i politički — nastavlja — mor-at ćemo prihvatiti evropske standarde. Ili se vratiti u po-vijest vlastitim etničkim kori-jenima i stvaranju društva prema nacionalnoj pripad-

nosti. Čini mi se da je to u ovim prostorima nemoguće, jednako kao što je nemoguće inzistirati na nacionalnosti bez priznavanja državnosti. Neprihvatanjem te realnosti samo se produbljuju neprija-teljstvo i mržnja. Jedanput, kad se napokon uspostavi demokratski poredak i Hrvatska bude priznata kao suverena i slobodna država, logično će biti da svaki nje-zin građanin osjeća pripad-nost upravo državljanstvom, bez obzira na svoju nacional-nost.

Jedan od razloga Rinina dolaska u Zagreb bila je po-nuda AMA-e Croatice iz To-ronta da list Gaudeamus ko-jem je glavni urednik, ovom prilikom tiska u domovini. ²
To društvo okuplja sve bivše studente i prijatelje Zagre-bačkog i ostalih hrvatskih sveučilišta koji žive na ame-

Granice moje domovine nikad nisu postojale, jer domovina je za mene trenutani osjećaj, prostor, vrijeme i široka krila kojima se može poletjeti i stići do neočekivanog, uhvatiti trenutak sreće.

ričkom kontinentu i Evropi. Gaudeamus izlazi tromjeseč-no na engleskom jeziku, a svrha mu je potaknuti svijest i ponos nekadašnjih stude-nata u iseljeništvu. Društva Alma Matis tradicija su u svi-jetu, a ovo hrvatsko bilo je potaknuto i željom da se po-mogne domovini.

— Sadržaj specijalnog iz-danja Gaudeamusa usredo-točen je na videnje stanja i događaja u Hrvatskoj, jer že-limo informirati svijet o na-šim strategijama, mjerama i prioritetima, ali i mobilizira-ti stručnjake i ljude s među-narodnim ugledom. Djelova-



BIOKEMIČARKA KAO NOVINARKA: Katarina Šlezić Obad ostavila je muža i dvije kćeri u Kanadi da bi došla izvještavati iz Hrvatske.

nje medija danas je djelova-nje kulture jednoga naroda, jedne države — zaključuje Katarina Šlezić-Obad, uvje-rena da se samo s realnih, inteligentnih pozicija može djelovati na promjene u vlas-titom društvu i u svijesti me-dunarodne zajednice.

Branka Vesely
Fotografija: Saša Novković

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS

by **Ingrid Doimi de Lupis de Frankopan e Subic**, Professor of International Law

Ingrid Detter Doimi de Lupis, D. Phil. (Oxon), Jur. Dr. (Stockholm), Lic. en droit (Paris), CHEI (Turin), is the Head of the Course The International Legal Order at the London School of Economics, a Senior Associate Member of St. Antony's College, Oxford, as well as Associate Professor of International Law in the University of Stockholm. She is a former Fellow of St. Antony's College and Senior Talbot Research Fellow of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, and has been Visiting Professor at the University of Melbourne. She is the author of nine books on International Law including the well known Law Making by International Organizations.

As a practitioner at the English Bar she has been Counsel in several international cases. She has also been Adviser on International Law to several Governments.

Under international law one normally requires a country to have a defined *population*, a defined *territory* and organs controlling that territory to be an independent state. In recent times the additional criteria of *democracy* and *viability* have been added: democracy means that the organs controlling the territory must have been democratically elected and viability implies that only a unit, able to exist in moderate economic terms, can break loose from a state.

In the case of Croatia it is clear that all requirements already exist. To start with the last one, Croatia is certainly economically viable by itself; it even supports much of the rest of Yugoslavia by the tourist industry alone. Next, territory is very well defined although some minor adjustments may have to be agreed by further negotiations. The population is homogeneous and of a coherent eth-

nic origin speaking the same language and having a common religion and a common history, much of which explains the readiness and eagerness of Croatia to separate itself from the Yugoslav federation and from other Yugoslav republics.

The kingpin of independence is obviously *democracy*. The Croatian government is democratically elected and has as such the voice of the Croatian people. In international law one has recently attached less importance to whether the government of a break away unit *actually controls* the territory and one usually only demands that the organs *are capable* of doing so. In other words, the requirement of democracy far overrides the requirement of factual control.

In Sweden the socialist government which has shown solidarity with the Serbs and which has allowed considerable exports of arms to the federal Yugoslav army controlled by Serbs has recently made a statement that "democracy is the least important criterion" (Svenska Dagbladet 29th August 1991). The statement, showing some ignorance of the development of international law and of international politics, indicates that some countries, even those holding themselves out to be liberal "welfare states", are political opportunists with regard to the independence of Croatia.

A government is always entitled to ask other states to come to its support if there is an internal crisis or even a civil war; but, this is not permissible un-

less there is a democratically elected government. This is what we do not have in Belgrade. The communist government in Belgrade was, it is true, democratically elected *but* only to represent interests outside Croatia. So the government is not representative of the State of Croatia. Secondly, Croatia has its own anti-communist government which was also democratically elected. Thus, it is inconceivable that the Belgrade government could have any legitimacy with regard to Croatia in terms of modern international law which places special importance on the requirement of democracy.

Croatia has fulfilled the requirements needed for outside recognition to a higher degree than the three Baltic Republics, there, the population had a high proportion of non-Balts, especially in the two northern republics. Croatians, supporting an anti-communist political theory, and being wholly integrated as a unit in their cultural and religious life, certainly merit the support in the of formal recognition of the West as the last victim of communist controlled oppression in Europe.

It is a crime under international law to supply arms to a fighting side (see my book on the Law of War, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp.66 et seq). Such support can only foment the strife and is in violation of article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter as illegitimate intervention. The intervention is contrary to the rules of international law but also *aggravated* by the fact that there is at present a state of war where outside states have the duty to refrain from helping the federal side which is not democratically elected to represent the Croatian side.

On the contrary, it is the duty of other states to come to the rescue of Croatia which is being savagely attacked by the last communists in Europe. History will not forgive those who are too cowardly to speak out. ●

Sarvaš - St. John's Baptist Church



MESSAGE FROM THE CHANCELLOR



Dear readers, dear alumni/ae and friends of the University of Zagreb and Croatian universities

Here is a new and somewhat different issue of your journal - a joint issue of *Gaudeamus* and *AMA Croatica*. You are all very well aware of the tragic situation in Croatia, which led the editorial boards of these two journals to join forces - together with the efforts of all Croatian alumni/ae throughout the world - to support the fight for democracy and freedom of Croatia.

In peaceful times the role of the university and its academic members, professors and students, is to develop and disseminate knowledge, culture, arts and science, and to work for the benefit of all in a better and more civilized world. In the time of crisis, in the time of war, as it is now in Croatia, we have to do our utmost as academic citizens to help in the defense of freedom, democracy and human values wherever they are threatened. In this struggle, one of the main weapons available is *truth*. Spreading the truth about Croatia, about its past and present, and about our projects for the future is what we can and are trying to do with this joint issue of our journals. The articles in this issue, written by eminent scholars and intellectuals, are meant in the first place to provide you with information about the political situation in Croatia, including the origins and historical development that led to this terrible aggression but also about perspectives for the future. They should also help you in your everyday contact with your friends and colleagues when trying to provide a meaningful explanation of these events. They are also meant to inform politicians, journalists, academics, all our friends in the business world, anybody you can reach, about what is happening in Croatia, about the true nature of our struggle to achieve independence, peace, freedom and democracy in our small country.

Croatia existed for so many hundreds of years and survived in spite of the harsh realities of our geopolitical position, either as "Antemurale Christianitatis" earlier or as a barrier to the aggression of the last communist army in Europe. We are proud of it and determined to live in our free Croatia, sharing its beauties with all people of good will. With this in mind read this journal, spread it, use it to argue for the cause of truth, for the cause of freedom and democracy in Croatia.

I should like to thank the editor-in-chief of this joint issue, Ms. Rina Obad-Šlezić, and all the authors of the articles on behalf of the University of Zagreb, on behalf of Croatia. We dedicate all our efforts to the cause of the democratic Croatia in the free world, so that all of us can live and work in peace which is essential for the life and functioning of a university. ●

MARIJAN ŠUNJIĆ
UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB

Marijan Šunjić

POLITICS AND HISTORY

WHAT HAS MILOŠEVIĆ LEARNED FROM HITLER

by Krešimir Džeba,
*journalist and Vice-
President of the Croa-
tian People's Party*

The criminal methods used by the Third Reich in the destruction of Czechoslovakia, under the pretext of protecting the Sudetenland Germans, are so closely comparable to the criminal methods used by the Serbians in their attack on Croatia, under the pretext of protecting Croatian Serbs, that it is evident that Belgrade in 1991 deliberately imitates Berlin in 1938.


Our hopes notwithstanding, the war which is raging throughout Croatian territory cannot be short even if the blaze on the front line temporarily ceases to burn and in spite of the praiseworthy involvement of the international community. What we are dealing with is a carefully planned war of conquest in which so much has been invested by the Serbian regime and the bolshevist army leadership (the same one which has defended Saddam Hussein in the infamous document issued by the Army Political Secretariat) that the threat of economic, financial and other sanctions by the West is not sufficient to make them withdraw without their "ounce of flesh" from the body of Croatia, which would be the only kind of withdrawal acceptable to our republic.

The threat to Croatian territorial integrity, however, does not come solely from the Serbian and army aggressor, but it also lurks within European peace conference halls. Even there Croatia could find herself squeezed between Milošević's gang-

sterism and the indolence of the western powers, which might be inclined to compromise their own principles in order to extinguish as quickly as possible the flames in the Yugo-powder keg. Lord Carrington's statement on the eve of the peace conference over which he presided in the Haag, that nothing was ruled out, not even the possibility of changing the borders within Yugoslavia is a warning that the fight for Croatian borders fought at the conference table will be no less violent than the one which is raging in Slavonia, Banija, Lika and Dalmatia. The demonstrated naivete of current Croatian politics makes such fears even greater.

Who can claim with any certainty that the western powers learned their lesson from their shameful appeasement of Hitler's invasion on Czechoslovakia in 1938, which was carried out under the pretext of protecting the "endangered" Sudetenland Germans? Since the Serbian and army aggression against Croatia is the exact copy of that historical episode it is important to be reminded of its course and characteristics, which will be done mainly on the basis of William L. Shirer's documents and analysis.

In Czechoslovakia, which after its establishment in 1918 developed into the most democratic, the richest and the most enlightened state in Middle Europe, there lived a large number of Hungarians, Ukrainians, Russians, Poles and some 3 million Germans, inhabiting Sudetenland, the industrially developed region along the northwestern and southwestern borders of the new republic. The national question of all those mi-




norities was not resolved in the best way possible, which made them less than loyal to the central government, but the status of the Sudetenland Germans was definitely the most favourable one, especially when compared to the status of the German minority in fascist Italy. They found it difficult to accept the loss of privileges they had had under the Habsburgs, but until Hitler's rise to power their demands did not go beyond the recognition of their rights to their language and culture and some degree of autonomy.

The virus of nazism spread among them as late as 1933, when Hitler became the German Chancellor. It was then that the Sudetenland German Party (SDP), led by Konrad Henlein, a teacher of physics education, was established. It operated under direct instructions from Berlin and was in turn secretly funded by the German Foreign Ministry. The ostensible endangering of the Sudetenland Germans was just an excuse for Hitler to occupy Czechoslovakia and his Field-Marshal von Blomberg made a plan for sudden assault codenamed "The Grün Case" as early as June 24th, 1937. Asevidenced



Dubrovnik in flames by *Photo-Press*



Just a little pebble on the way! Otto Reisinger

by a German Foreign Ministry memorandum, the role of the Sudetenland Germans was to put forward demands "which would be unacceptable to the Czech Government". After a secret meeting between Henlein, Hitler, Ribbentrop and Hess on March 28th, 1938, the leader of the SDP summed up Hitler's instructions in the following way: "We must always demand so much that we are never satisfied".

Prompted by Berlin to show their discontent, the Sudetenland Germans instigated much violence, which may have seemed only to superficial observers, among them the British Prime Minister and the French President, like a struggle for national rights. What it was actually about became evident on September 5th, 1938 when the President of Czechoslovakia, Benes, at the height of the crisis invited the Sudetenland German leaders, Kundt and Sebekovski, to the ancient Hradchani castle, asking them to put forward their demands which he was ready to accept. "Good God! They've given us everything!" Karl Herman Frank, the SDP deputy leader exclaimed in amazement. But Hitler did not care for the rights of his countrymen, all he cared for was their role as detonators of the German-Czech war. Two days later, Henlein, instructed by Berlin, broke off the talks under a transparent excuse about some incident involving Czechoslovakian police in Moravian Ostrava.

In order to understand the present day justification for the aggression against Croatia, it is especially important to mention Hitler's conversation with the 69-year old British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, in Berchtesgaden, on September 15. After comprehensively praising his own contribution to peace and Anglo-German friendship, the Fuhrer finally touched upon the problem which he had decided to solve "one way or the other": that 3 million Germans in Czechoslovakia "must return within the Reich borders". (Milošević says the same thing, using different words: "institutionally or extra-institutionally all the Serbs must live in one country".) The aggressors' general tendency to falsify history is exemplified by the fact that Hitler spoke of "returning" the Sudetenland



Osijek - Forced underground, photo by *Večernji list*

Germans, although they had never lived in Germany but in Austria, just as the parts of Croatia which the Serbs want to annex have never been within their borders.

The care for the "endangered" Sudetenland Germans, "extracted" from their fatherland, to which they had never belonged, was just an excuse for achieving the real aim, which Hitler, signing his new instructions for "the *Grün Case*" on May 30th, 1938, expressed thus: "My unalterable decision is to destroy Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future".

To comprehend the present day Serbian aggression against Croatia it is interesting to note what kind of war was planned against Czechoslovakia. "The *Grün Case*" was the first example of total war which Hitler would apply from then on with great success. Although its realization depended mostly on the army, aided by the Luftwaffe, an especially important role was assigned to what the Nazi strategists called "propaganda war" and "economic war". In the directives issued by Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the elements of total war are described in the following manner: "Propaganda war should, on the one hand, frighten the Czechs by threats and destroy their resistance, and on the other hand it should show to the national minorities how to aid our war operations and favourably influence the neutral ones. Economic war consists of all available economic means which could accelerate the collapse of Czechoslovakia..."

Nothing new under the sun! The war forced upon Croatia is an exact copy of the total war applied in 1938 in the case of

Czechoslovakia. Its propagandistic advance party, which would impress even Goebbels, was intensified after the mass meeting at Gazimestan and was followed by a variety of measures for the economic destruction of Croatia - from the tax duty war, printing of false money and plundering of Croatian property in Serbia to a systematic destruction of tourism, transportation and industrial buildings.

In the *Memorandum* which expressed Hitler's demands to the British Prime Minister on September 23, it was stipulated - and accepted by the western powers in Munich - that hundreds of thousands of Czechs, who were forced to leave Sudetenland, should not take with them any household goods, not even a single cow to feed them. Their fate is now repeated by the new victims of genocide - tens of thousands of Croatian refugees.

The most important experience that can be drawn from the Nazi aggression against Czechoslovakia applies to the cowardly concessions made by the western powers, namely England and France, which betrayed their obligations in a situation when the German generals admitted that their western front would not hold more than three weeks. "Isn't it terrible, abnormal, incredible that we are digging the trenches here... because of quarrels between people in some far off land, who we know nothing about!" Chamberlain said on the radio, trying to convince the English that his "peacekeeping" policies were reasonable when giving up a part of Czech territory to the Germans.

As far as our current situation is concerned there are two

indicative commentaries from the London *Times* which reflect the views of Chamberlain's cabinet and which show how appeasement and acceptance of a fait accompli always find justification in convenient "principles" and "reasonable" arguments. *The Times* of April 1 recommended that the Czech Government allow its minorities the right to "self-determination", even if it meant "their leaving Czechoslovakia", suggesting for the first time the plebiscite as a way of determining what the German minority really wanted. The commentary published in the April 7th issue of *The Times* went a step further trying to convince the Czechs that the occupation of Sudetenland was actually a blessing in disguise: "Maybe the Czech government would be wise to consider whether to reject the plan favoured in some circles, and which would make Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous state by seceding the border region inhabited by a foreign population which borders with a nation it is racially linked with. The advantages achieved by the homogeneity of Czechoslovakia would far outweigh the loss of the border region inhabited by the Sudetenland Germans".

"A TOTAL AND UNMITIGATED DEFEAT"

What the article fails to mention, of course, is the fact that the amputation of Sudetenland would leave Czechoslovakia not only without its richest industrial region, but without its natural mountainous protective barrier as well, and without its "Maginot line" of fortification - besides the French one, the strongest in Europe - defenceless at the mercy of the aggressive neighbourhood.

Through the final defeat of the West in Munich, which Benesh foresaw when saying: "We have been most treacherously betrayed", a developed industrial nation was torn apart and wrecked overnight. Just to start with, Hitler snatched 98,000 square kilometres of its territory, inhabited by 2,800,000 Sudetenland Germans and 800,000 Czechs. But that was not all. Using the right to "self-determination" of minorities as a pretext, Hungary snatched 19,500 square kilometres, Po-

land a further 1,700 square kilometres around Teshin (where more than 50% of the population was Czech). According to German data, the mangled country lost 66% of its coal, 80% of its lignite, 86% of its chemicals, 80% of its cement, 80% of its textiles, 70% of its iron and steel, 70% of its electrical energy and 40% of its forests. All this, however, was not enough to satisfy the appetite of the aggressor: on November 21st, Hitler ordered his military commanders to liquidate the remaining part of Czechoslovakia. The order was dutifully carried out soon afterwards.

The sacrificing of Czechoslovakia - and that is the most important lesson to be learned from this historical episode - did not satisfy Hitler nor did it save the world from the horrors of war. On the contrary, the "peace-promoting" politics of Chamberlain and Daladier opened the doors wide for World War II, by missing the timely chance to discourage The Third Reich in its insane expansionism by failing to discourage the half-mad expansionism of the Third Reich at the right time. If they had listened to the "war-mongering" Churchill instead, the spark of war would have been extinguished before it spread, since even the German generals were almost unanimous in their estimate that at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis Hitler would have been defeated by western powers, and "in quick order" at that. Speaking in the House of Commons on October 5th, Churchill said: "We have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat... We have passed an awful milestone in our history... And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning".

THE THIRD REICH = SERBIA

It would do no harm if we too in Croatia could logically discuss the question of what a "peace-pursuing" policy is essentially and what a "belligerent" one is. This superficial reminder concerning the aggression against Czechoslovakia makes sense only if it contributes to a better understanding of the reasons, immediate causes, character, strategy, and behaviour of these active subjects in the war against Croatia waged by Serbia with the sup-

port of the Federal Army, which has been faithful to Milošević, ever since the famous Eighth session (of the Serbian League of Communists - translator's note) because it is known that they feel him to be a guarantee for their further existence as an army and the caste privileges that this entails. The parallel between the German Fascist, and the Serbian Bolshevik-nationalist aggression is by no means far fetched because they both have their source in totalitarian consciousness which results in the similarity of aims, actions, and even rhetoric. It suffices to change certain names and concepts from the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in order to get a fairly faithful picture of what we are experiencing today: e.g.,

The Third Reich = Serbia; Czechoslovakia = Croatia; Sudetenland = the SAO Krajina and western Slavonia; Sudetenland Germans = Serbs in Croatia (partly); the Party of the Sudetenland Germans = the Serbian Democratic Party, "The Grün Case" = the plan "Fortress"; Hitler = Milošević, Benesh = Tuđman; Henlein = Babić (& co.), etc.

It remains to be seen whether a new, European Chamberlain and a new Daladier may appear on the scene and who these might be?

Historical comparisons should of course not be strained more than might be reasonable, but one must equally avoid the typical Balkan primitive way of thinking, according to which history always begins again starting with the one who comes to power, something that we in Croatia have not been spared for somewhat longer than a year.

EASILY FORESEEABLE OUTCOMES

Croatian policy has been mistaken in expecting too much from foreign political factors, believing that it is they who will do what it is upon ourselves to do. The naive exultation which our leaders accompanied the signing of the EC documents in the "Palace of Federation" came therefore as no surprise; nor did their fast cooling off, which happened only a few days later as in the meantime it had become clear that the armistice agreement was only an incitement to ever more barbarous slaughter



Sunja - A house becomes a fortress, photo by *Večernji list*



Banija - Safety, photo by *Večernji list*



Topusko - The frame without a picture, photo by *Večernji list*

and destruction of civilian and economic targets in Vukovar, Osijek, Petrinja, Sisak, Gospić, on the Adriatic coast, and elsewhere. (Just as Mr. Tuđman's meeting with the army leadership at peaceful Brioni, a failure both from the political and the military point of view, turned out to be only a necessary break for the escalation of terror in addition to signifying a recognition of the generals - who had in fact performed a coup - as political partners).

If the war imposed upon Croatia is understood in terms of Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia, then such outcomes can easily be foreseen. Literally coerced to associate himself with the armistice agreement through Hans van den Broek's ultimatum "Sign it or leave it", Milošević interpreted his own signature as a signal that his Serbianized army was to speed up the occupation of the areas within the planned borders of "great Serbia" and even more ruthlessly to destroy strategic points which stand in the way of any linking of the Serbian enclaves in Croatia into some kind of unity.

As for the international community, it identified the aggressor and its victim not so much thanks to the "wisdom of Croatian policy" which was inclined towards self-glorification, as because of the palpable evidence of corpses, exiles, and ruins: words are unnecessary where facts speak for themselves. It would, however, be rash to believe that the European Community will do the job for us, at least until the number of people killed reaches the "critical mass" that can make the great powers move. It is important to bear in mind that the EC are still much more an economic union than a political one, and that their policy is for the time being only a fairly unco-ordinated sum of national political interests, quite frequently in mutual disagreement, especially among London, Paris, and Berlin.

In trying to accomplish their unpleasant business, the Western countries will aim towards necessary compromises starting from the factual situation, unfavourable to Croatia because it is its territory that is occupied (in an area certainly larger than 4 or 5%, which is another instance of self-delusion on the part of the Croatian government

and of pushing one's head into the sand when confronted by unpleasant facts. In such circumstances, one fears, every compromise reached at the diplomatic table can only be at the expense of Croatia, irrespectively of the principals. An inclination towards such kinds of compromise can be also discerned from the fact that the Declaration of the Council of Ministers of the EC has not been given any place in the preamble of the *Memorandum* concerning the widened deployment of monitoring missions.

This is not pessimism, but caution: in politics, as in life, it is better to reckon with what is worse and achieve better consequences, than the other way round.

MORE THAN POWER IS AT STAKE

It has to be acknowledged that Serbia has publicly made known its ambitions to expand in the *Memorandum* of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and in the recent programmatic interview of Mihailo Marković in *Politika*, as well as by Milošević, who in his speech at Gazimestan openly announced that for the purpose of implementing the Serbian imperialist national program he would not shun war. In spite of these clear "smoke signals", Croatian policy has had "great illusion or wrong estimations, as you like", as has recently been asserted in a cruelly persuasive way by Dr. Antun Bebler, one of the most prominent military experts and the key personality in Slovenian defense during the "Alpine war", thus a person undeniably competent and objective.

The erroneous strategic estimations of Croatian policy concerned in the first place the character and the objects of the rebellion of Croatian Serbs, the scope of Milošević's policy of conquest, the role that the so-called Yugoslav National Army would play in this, the exaggeration of a possible engagement of Europe in solving the crisis and the method of solving the problems which have fallen upon Croatia (while it was believed that a peaceful agreement with Milošević and Kadijević was possible even at the price of losing all "natural allies" in Yugoslavia).

HOW TO MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME

Erroneous strategic estimates where the soil out of which have grown all these weaknesses which are now such a heavy burden for Croatia in its decisive fight for independence and territorial integrity. We have in mind the rejection of the concept of total national defense (irrespectively of available weapons), the acceptance of a complete disarmament of Croatian territorial defense (which to a smaller extent occurred even during the new Government, which did not want to increase the generals' hostility, probably believing that it was still possible to come to an agreement with them); the reluctance clearly to define the aggressor, the faulty conception and organization of defense, the lack of united, professional command of Croatian defense, the failure to procure arms for the Croatian armed forces, in whatever way, during the long period in the first half of this year when it was being believed that the crisis could come to a peaceful resolution at sterile meetings between the Presidents of the Republics, the missing of the unique opportunity to strike a decisive common blow against the aggressive Yugoslav National Army during the invasion of Slovenia, etc.

To err is human but it is not acceptable that the Government, in the decisive moments for the freedom of Croatia, should a priori reject every well-meaning criticism and suggestion, and disqualify them as attempts to gain tiny political points from the public, as President Tuđman repeatedly declared in his interview in *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* (September 1st, 1991). That this however is not true can be seen from the series of statements in Croatian newspapers by the most responsible people of the successful Slovenian defense. They have criticised, unsparingly and with persuasive arguments, the conception, organization, and strategy of the defense of Croatia (Janez Janša in *Slobodna Dalmacija* of August 31st, Jelko Kacin in *Nedjeljni Vjesnik* of September 8th, and Dr. Antun Bebler in *Danas* of September 10th 1991).

All these remarks and suggestions by the leaders of the Slovenian defense were already

offered much earlier by the Croatian People's Party, in a similar or identical manner, publicly or through internal channels. In particular, concerning military matters, General Ivan Rukavina, the celebrated hero of the last war has been particularly outspoken in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee for all-national defense of that party, which is the strongest among the opposition parties (a fact substantiated also by the research done by *Globus*, among other pieces of evidence). Unfortunately, they never met with any readiness to listen, for they were always looked at only in terms of cheap political party competition and not as a since-

re attempt to contribute to the improvement of the defense of Croatia, as if it were part of a pre-election game and not a matter concerning the destiny of our country.

War is a state of affairs which requires an active engagement of all the potential of the people, and it is only in this way that the time which has been lost so far can be made up, so that before long Croatia can effectively maintain her dignity, freedom, and territory. In spite of everything we repeat that Croatia cannot lose the war which has been forced upon her but only if we are wise and decisive enough to make the best out of our kairos.

THE POWERLESSNESS OF CROATIAN PROPAGANDA IN THE WORLD

by Vjekoslav Krsnik, columnist, former editor-in-chief of Croatian Press Agency - HINA and ex-stringer for BBC

In the circumstances of contemporary communications, the success of any policy, especially that of a state, depends very much on the extent to which this policy is internationally recognized. Subdued during both the first and second Yugoslavia, Croatia did not have a chance to promote and make known to the world its striving for independence. The short period of existence of the so-called Independent State of Croatia, Fascist puppet state, made Croatia's struggle for independence even more difficult in the period following the Second World War.

Therefore, at the time of the fall of Communist regimes and the rise of democracy in Eastern Europe, it is particularly important for Croatia to present to the world in the best possible way its struggle for independence and freedom during most of the entire post-war period,

especially since in 1948, Tito broke with Stalin. Thereafter, Yugoslavia played an important role in the stability of Europe and the world, as a result of many ideological, political, strategic, military and other factors, most notably, its engagement in the Non-Alignment Movement. In these circumstances any attempt at encouraging its internal disintegration was doomed to failure. The consequences of such an attitude to Yugoslavia can be seen in the current war in which the international community looks on at the processes of disintegration of what used to be a strong federation. Such an attitude towards any potential changes in Yugoslavia was most obvious at the beginning of the 1970s, when Josip Broz Tito crushed all democratic movements without any serious objections from abroad. This particularly refers to the "Croatian Spring" movement, which threatened the integrity of the Yugoslav multinational country. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the overthrow of communism, the subdued Croatian independence cause got a new chance. The new circumstances of the disintegrating post-Titoist Yugosla-



Zagreb - The Old Town



Sunja - The tragedy of generations, photo by *Večernji list*

via were taken advantage of by the proponents of a Greater Serbia, who launched the notorious Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science. Under the pressure of the Communist and pro-Yugoslav ideologies, Croatia did not adequately respond to the Memorandum, nor did have the right strategy for the achievement of its centuries-old goal, independence.

The democratic world was concentrating primarily on the development of Perestroika in the Soviet Union, while the events and changes in Yugoslavia were seen as marginal. With its self-managing socialism, Yugoslavia was for a long time an independent factor in the Communist world, and as such was the favourite of the West. While it was acceptable to the rest of the world that Slovenia and Croatia should hold their first free elections since the Second World War, it was hard to understand why these two republics would want independence within a country which did not share any of the problems of the so-called "socialist community", led by the Soviet Union. All Croatian political moves in the last few years have been labelled as secessionist, nationalist or even Fascist. Yugoslav diplomacy, especially that in the Western countries, encouraged a radical brand of Croatia nationalism, which relied on Pavelić's Independent State of Croatia, and Croats living abroad did not realize that this was a policy that could hardly win any approval from the democratic world when the issue of Croatian independence came up. In such circumstances it was understandable that the Western media in the post-Titoist era at first saw the rise of Slobodan Milošević as the emergence of a new strong leader of Yugoslavia. He guaranteed the preservation of Yugoslavia by leading it the way Tito had done. Croatia simply did not have any adequate strategy, organization or people to fight this propaganda and debunk its Greater-Serbian background. It did not have any substantial lobby abroad, either. The Greater-Serbia ideology was coming from Belgrade, where the majority of foreign correspondents are Serbs, who in the countries for which they work presented the first democratic election as a revival of

the Fascist Croatia of the Second World War. Croatia simply did not have an answer to all this. Because of incompetence and inexperience in the first days of democracy, it did not take advantage of all of the opportunities to win the confidence of the world.

As the first editor of the newly established press agency, HINA, I witnessed this agency's failure to come up with a plan for promoting the truth about Croatia. The agency is still incapable of doing it, owing to the low level of technical equipment, not to mention the inadequate professional skills of its journalists.

Thanks to the reputation it established in the preceding decades, the TANJUG remains the main source of information on what is going on in a disintegrating Yugoslavia. The TANJUG is an agency strongly influenced by the Yugoslav and Serbian propaganda, as a result of the almost 90% Serbian and Montenegrin nationality of its staff.

Croatia did not take any steps, nor did it do as much as it could to start its own shortwave radio broadcasting service in foreign languages. The Ministry for Information has retained more or less the same staff which it inherited from the Communist regimes, and the new people were not up to the job. Besides, in as little as one year there were three different ministers with this portfolio. The daily and periodical publications of this Ministry, which are especially important in war conditions are thus of little use to foreign journalists, who find it difficult to understand the complexity of the ethnic situation in both Yugoslavia and Croatia, as well as the history of the Croatian people. Is it not strange that Zagreb as the host city of numerous sport events won major international recognition for the organization of press services, and now, one of the dirtiest wars that Europe has seen is waged on the territory of Croatia, there is no adequate press service?

Although it was extremely important for Croatia to win the approval of international institutions, it took the new, democratically elected government over half a year to open its first offices abroad. In doing that, two big mistakes were made. The first promotional

CROATIA'S BORDERS

by Mladen Klemenčić,
University of Zagreb

The present borders of the Republic of Croatia are for the most part defined by the lines of division established long before the formation of the common South Slav state in 1918. Thus, Croatia's borders can be said to have a long historical continuity, which is understandable in view of the fact that Croatia has managed to maintain elements of state sovereignty throughout its history. Out of the total length of Croatia's land borders extending for 2.028 km, only one tenth, or 200-250 km are borders drawn for the first time in the Yugoslav state.

The Croatian-Hungarian border, is for most of its length, one of the oldest in Europe. This is particularly true of the sections of the border marked by the River Drava, which has always separated the Croatian and Hungarian states. The land border on the left side of the Drava (Prekodravlje) is also historically well-established, for these are the parts that used to form part of the Military Borderland and that were incorporated into Croatia when the Borderland was demilitarized. Actually, the Military Borderland had never been *de iure* excluded from Croatian sovereignty.

In the Međimurje region, where it is naturally and geographically defined by the River Mura, the border is more recent only in a sense. It was finally defined after the First World War, when Međimurje, previously a part of Hungary, was joined to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It should be stressed, however, that Hungary's sovereignty over Međimurje was questionable, since that region had earlier belonged to Croatia and the great majority of people had always been Croatian, despite strong Magyarization efforts.

The border in Baranja is the most recent section of the Croatian-Hungarian border. It was first established in 1920, without reference to any earlier divisions. In this way, the southern part of the former Hungarian district of Baranya was joined to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a logical whole with the gravitationally strong city of Osijek. Besides, this was an ethnically mixed area in which Hungarians lived side by side with considerable numbers of Germans, Croats, and, to a lesser extent, Serbs.

The Croatian-Slovene border is also for the most part an older European border. The sections of the border on the River Sutla, on Žumberak Mountain and on the River Kupa are parts of the historical border that had for centuries separated Croatia from the Slovene regions of Carniola and Styria. The border in Međimurje, too, largely coincides with the earlier borders of that Croatian region, except for a few villages in the municipality of Štrigova which were joined to Slovenia in 1945.

In contradistinction to the greater, well-established and historically confirmed border, the western part of the Croatian-Slovene is much more recent. The border in Istria was drawn after the Second World War, in 1945, when the temporary Free Territory of Trieste was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. The part that came under Yugoslavia was split between Croatia and Slovenia along ethnic lines. A correction to that border was made in 1956, when several villages in the municipality of Buje were joined to Slovenia.

The Croatian-Bosnian/Herzegovinian border is the longest in Croatia. Its present line is the result of centuries of Ottoman rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two sections of the border are the northern-western section, marked by the



Osijek harbour, Humanity, photo by Večernji list


offices were not opened in New York, Washington, Bonn, London, Bruxelles or Paris, but in Stuttgart and Munich, in order to satisfy the vanity of the loyal members of the party that had won the elections.

The criterion for employment at these offices was membership in the leading party, HDZ, irrespective of capabilities and qualifications for the job. The best proof of their incompetence is the insufficient representation of Croatia and its policy concerning the Yugoslav crisis in the media of these countries.

From the very start, Croatia has not had a strong enough lobby in those countries which have a decisive role in the creation of European and world policy. The worst situation is precisely in those countries which are the most important for Croatia. Despite the presumed 2,5 million Americans of Croatian origin, the Croatian lobby in the United States is less influential than that of Serbia, which is understandable in view of the several decades of American relationships with Serbia and later on with Yugo-

slavia. However, it does not make much sense that the Albanian lobby should be more influential and more efficient than that of Croatia. This should obviously be accounted for by the Croatia's inadequate organization and reliance on the wrong people and wrong methods of action. Although the biggest Croatian emigrant organization in the world, Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), has been active in America for over 90 years, it did not have much support in its attempts to present the Croatian struggle for democracy and independence to the American public, because it had been ignored by the new Croatian government. Considering that the Croatian identity and ideas were suppressed within Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that no such lobby exists in other countries. However, it is hard to understand that in the year and the half since the democratic elections more has not been done.

In short, this can be accounted for by the mistakes of the Croatian propaganda which has been the weakest point of the Croatian foreign policy. ●



The borders according to the time and constituent parts of Croatia 1. Borders constituted before 20th century 2. Borders constituted between 1918 and 1920 3. Borders constituted from 1945 and later 4. Croatia and Slavonia 5. Dalmatia 6. Međimurje and Baranja 7. Istra, Rijeka, Zadar, Lošinj-Cres, Lastovo and Palagruža 8. Minor corrections of the borders after 1945 or modifications of the former historical borders

rivers Sava and Una and essentially reflecting the historical border of Croatia and Slavonia with the Ottoman Empire, and the southern section, the historical border of Venetian Dalmatia and the Dubrovnik Republic with the same Ottoman Empire.

The border on the Sava and the lower flow of the Una was largely fixed by the Treaty of Karlovci in 1699. The Treaty of Požarevac in 1718 corrected it by extending the Croatian territory further east, thus bringing the whole of Srijem under Croatian rule. The same border was confirmed again by the Treaty of Svištovo in 1791, which was particularly important for the fixing of the Croatian-Bosnian border along the upper Una. Having won back the greater part of Lika in 1699, Croatia extended its sovereignty over Kordun and Pounje (Una Valley) in Lika. Thus, the Treaty of Svištovo fixed its borders more or less as they are

today. That same border served as a starting point in drawing the line between the federal constituent Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1945. The historical border was on that occasion corrected only in the district of Bihać, where the formerly Croatian villages of Medjudražje, Skočaj and Zavalje were joined to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The southern section of the Croatian-Bosnian/Herzegovinian border dates from the eighteenth century, when the Venetian-Turkish border in Dalmatia was revised on two occasions. The present border is that of the so-called Linea Mocenigo, which gave Venetian Dalmatia its final shape in 1718.

In the extreme southeast, the present Croatian border is border of the Dubrovnik Republic established in 1699/1700. It is from that date, too, that the Croatian territory is interrupted at Neum, giving Bosnia-Herzegovina an outlet to the sea. This

was part of a diplomatic scheme by Dubrovnik, giving the Ottoman Empire a small stretch of the coast in order to avoid having a common border with Venetian Dalmatia.

After the fall of Venice, Dalmatia came under Austrian rule, which merged it in the early nineteenth century with what used to be the Dubrovnik Republic and the formerly outlying Venetian possession of Boka Kotorska and Budva. All these parts together formed the Kingdom of Dalmatia, whose territory was further extended along the coast south of Budva, all the way to Spič, in 1878. When the lines of division between the Yugoslav Republics were being drawn in 1945, this historical border was respected in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not in relation to Montenegro.

The relatively short *Croatian-Montenegrin border* corresponds to the border of the Dubrovnik Republic, but not to



Pakrac - The fierce fighting

in 1945, when it was decided that in view of the predominantly Croatian population and the gravitational pull and traffic importance of Osijek, Baranja should belong to Croatia.

The southern section of the Croatian-Serbian border was also drawn for the first time in 1945, splitting the historically Croatian region of Srijem. Until 1918, Croatia extended all the way to the confluence of the Sava and the Danube. The deci-

sion to divide Srijem was made, not without disagreements, by Yugoslavia's state and Party leadership, while the actual on-the-spot drawing of lines was entrusted to a special commission. The border was drawn on the ethnic principle, so that Eastern Srijem with the predominantly Serbian population belonged to Serbia, and Western Srijem, whose population is mostly Croatian, belonged to Croatia.

Thus, it can be said that the greatest part of Croatia's current borders is the legacy of earlier historical periods. In places where the borders were revised compared with those that Croatia had as it entered the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, the revision was as a rule made at the expense of Croatia. The greatest such departures are to be found on the Croatian-Montenegrin and Croatian-Serbian

borders, while the departure is somewhat less on the Croatian-Bosnian/Herzegovinian border.

Generally speaking, the northern and western borders of Croatia are old and stable. Its present eastern borders are the result of continuing contraction and loss of territory, which began with Turkish invasions and ended with the inter-Republic border-fixing in Yugoslavia in 1918.

Balkan and Intra-Yugoslav Position of Croatia and Slovenia

by Radovan Pavić,
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Depending on specific changeable social relations, the spatial position of a state in all its variants - notably geopolitical and transportational - can, and quite often does, have a great existential significance; that is, it can essentially influence international relations. In that sense, it is sufficient to point out a familiar example often pointed out, which merits constant re-emphasis owing to its importance and strikingness. The example we have in mind here is of the special interest shown by the United States and the West in general in helping socialist Yugoslavia during the period of intensive cold war (we underline 'socialist') and in its preservation and strengthening. All this for two reasons: *first*, through its type of socialism, Yugoslavia fractures the Soviet model; *second*, owing to its geopolitical position, it plays a major role in global relations, notably in an anti-Soviet context. Consequently, the West supports a socialist country, supports socialism as a political system (take note of that!), supports its historical enemy in-

terent upon destroying capitalism. And it does all this because the socialist country in question, owing to its specific position, performs geopolitical functions extremely valuable to the West. This means that *the role and value of locations at a particular time and in a particular space transcends other major political factors, transcends the significance of a particular social system and structure of government.*

However, in spite of the support from the West, this situation was unfavourable and very sensitive for Yugoslavia. This requires emphasizing an essential fact dating from the turn of the decade 1980s/90s. It was then that, thanks to the neodotente, the geopolitical position of Yugoslavia, thereby of Croatia, was dramatically improved beyond all recognition, which is a very impressive fact difficult to overestimate. For Yugoslavia, specifically for Croatia, this precisely means the following. For this part of Europe - as the link between Central Europe (the Alps and the Danube Basin), the Mediterranean and the Balkans the presently valid consequences of their location are substantially different. This location can now be made use of in the most profitable manner, that is through a valorization in


terms of international traffic. This is the result of an exceptionally favourable transport-and-transit position of both Croatia and Yugoslavia, significant not only in regional and European but also in European-Asian terms. Consequently, there has been a marked shift in the significance and valuation of the geosition involved. A period of insecurity defined by geopolitics and geostrategy, hampering growth and fraught with numerous dangers, was replaced by a period of security with a full array of advantages inherent in security and a favourable location. This, then, is the most important context within which to observe the current geosition of Croatia and Yugoslavia, naturally keeping in mind that, at this moment, we are dealing with mere initial possibilities depending on the cessation of war in Croatia.

Regional International Position of Croatia and Slovenia

In current circumstances, the international position of Croatia and Slovenia is favourable, specifically as regards *Italy* and its irredentism. This is not so only for international and international-law reasons (which might be termed the reasons of Eu-

rope), but also because of a substantially changed ethnic makeup, which must be regarded as a final and irreversible fact, making any territorial claims irrelevant. Italy's interests in Croatia and Slovenia are now different: penetration of capital and transit uses (access to the Danube Basin). These are the only proper and well-founded reasons for Italian interests on the opposite Adriatic shore, and by no means any territorial claims.

Austria is also interested in Slovenia and Croatia, and in a positive sense. The problem of Slovene and Croatian minorities, though still not completely and satisfactorily solved, cannot be a cause of alienation and merely correct but reserved conventional relations. Thus, here too are manifested Austria's general economic and specific transport interests in the direction of the sea and the Balkans. In addition, Austria is interested in its immediate southern neighbours (but also the entire former Yugoslavia) in its role as a possible link between the European Community and the Balkan area. Austria is also interested in having as immediate neighbours proper Middle-European countries rather than the Bolshevizized Balkans.



Dinko Žibrat

Hungary's relation to Slovenia and Croatia must also be viewed in a positive context. This country, too, is interested in its minority in both republics, while the presence particularly of Croats in its territory calls for a neighbourly response and observance of European civilizational norms. Especially so, because the latter legitimizes Hungarian requests for a protection of its own minority's rights in Rumanian Transylvania. Moreover, Hungary is vitally interested in the transit access to the Adriatic through the port of Rijeka.

Consequently, what we have in all this three cases (Italy, Austria, Hungary) is a favourable co-operative environment making possible a link to Europe. This link is already well-defined. Both Croatia and Slovenia are members of the Alpine-Adriatic Regional Community and, through Yugoslavia, in the European Hexagonal. Also, the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, debolshevization and assumption of a democratic identity in Slovenia and relevant portions of Croatia make these areas indisputably parts of a newly-risen and restored Central Europe. These puts Croatia in particular firmly within top principal civilizational circles of Europe: Central-European and Mediterranean.

Unlike the favourable co-operative environment of Slovenia

and Croatia, the remainder of Yugoslavia bordering on other countries (i. e., Serbia and Macedonia), show more complex characteristics. Thus, Serbia realizes contacts both in a co-operative and an unco-operative environment, while Macedonia finds itself within a totally unco-operative environment. Of special importance for Serbia is favourable contact and political co-operation with Romania, because both countries are run by merely renamed and transvestite communists/bolsheviks, so the ideological kinship is understandably close. Also, there is the territorial contiguity with the republics of the former USSR, which is also not without relevance. Besides, both Serbia and Romania have significant Hungarian minorities and, therefore, common interests in dealing with this problem. Though Serbia has no common border with Greece, favourable conditions with Greece are important, not only because they are a natural aspiration in a Balkan framework, but also because thereby pressure can be exerted on Macedonia which, for militant Greater-Serbian, is no more than "South Serbia".

As regards *Bulgaria*, Serbia can count on merely correct relations (except in the case of a possible carving up of Macedonia). Contacts with *Albania* are naturally of a pronouncedly unco-operative character.



Kostajnica - The future belongs to them, photo by *Večernji list*

The geopolitical position of *Macedonia* is a specific case. Its relations to both Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece must be characterized as an unco-operative environment, which is the least favourable case of all Yugoslav republics.

Specific Position of Croatia and Slovenia in Relation to Bloc-Aligned and Neutral Countries

Unlike the period of the cold war when bloc relations had a dominating and unfavourable character, under present conditions the evaluation of bloc contacts and the patterning of neutral and non-bloc countries is fundamentally different. Slovenia still has a common border with NATO, while Croatia also participates in the Adriatic as a NATO-dominated sea. In that context, the fact of Croatia bordering on Slovenia is favourable, as is Slovenia's contiguity with NATO (through Italy), the reason being that under the present conditions NATO, as one of the principal identity components of Europe, is a factor of security for Croatia and Slovenia. Further, contact with neutral Austria continues being favourable. Austria's neutrality is today significantly different from the one during the cold war. True, Austria (together with Yugoslavia) was then also part of the important European space between the


West and the East. However, its neutrality now is substantially different because politically it is becoming vitally interested in the stability of the areas to its south and south-east.

Croatia and Slovenia as Interspace and Buffer Zone

One fundamental historical characteristic applies to the area of Yugoslav lands. For a protracted period, these lands served as contacts of different worlds: the Christian West and the Muslim East. For a long time, Croatia was the Antemurale Christianitatis, with the sense of contact and a specific outer wall still surviving. So we are dealing here with continuity, an important aspect in evaluating the position of a country and its growth potential.

The contact character of Croatia can be illustrated with several instances. Today, Croatia is the contact area with the still bolshevized East (Serbia, Montenegro), and with the area where one ethnos (Serbian) is seeking domination and trying to conquer territory. The latter aim has been adopted irrespective of the actual numerical relations of the ethnic groups, because in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo the Serbs are after all a minority, in some places a very pronounced one. In this connection, Croatia is the contact area between a safe

Osijek - David and Goliath, photo by *Večernji list*



COMMENTARY OF THE MAP OF CROATIA AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL SURROUNDING

and stable Europe and the unsafe Balkans. That, however, is not all. Croatia is a contact area with Serbia which, at the present turn of the century, is engaged in imperialist politics: i.e. seeking to conquer territory both historically and ethnically non-Serbian. This means that we are dealing here with the contact between Europe and Barbaria. It should be pointed out here that the Greater-Serbia territorial imperialism is the only surviving example of such imperialism in the whole of Europe. While the rest of Europe has definitely left behind the stage when solutions to political questions could be attempted in a territorial, that is geopolitical, manner, Serbia, with its aspirations toward a Great Serbia, is now precisely in that stage. Therefore, one should keep repeating, at least when dealing with the international community: *the war in Croatia is no ethnic war between the Croats and the Serbs, but an aggressive war by Serbia, utilizing the federal army and Serbs recruited from Croatia, aimed at establishing a Great Serbia.*

Croatia, consequently, represents the contact between Europe proper and the Balkans. It is contact between various forms of communities in the West but - and this is particularly important - of voluntary communities and an enforced community in the South-East. The latter, of course applies to the present Yugoslavia, or a possible future Yugoslavia in the shape of a four-member federation, more precisely a form of Great Serbia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and, probably, Macedonia).

In addition, Croatia is also the contact area toward those republics (Serbia and Montenegro) which in the present circumstances are supposed to resist a putative new "imperialism" of the new "Great Germany" and the "Fourth Reich" from the north-west. These two republics, together with Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece and Macedonia, are also expected to be a barrier to the westward penetration of Islam. This penetration must also be checked in Great Serbia itself and particularly its expansion out of Albania and Turkey. It should be pointed out that it is exactly in the place where the Croatian

by Radovan Pavić,
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1. The International Recognition of Slovenia

a) The state of Slovenia is already practically outside Yugoslavia and awaits imminent international recognition. It is surrounded by friendly states: Italy, Austria, Hungary and Croatia.

2. Central Europe:

a) The states of Central Europe (Mitteleuropa, ME). Slovenia is completely integrated into this cultural sphere.

b) Part of Croatia (and Serbian Vojvodina) also belongs to ME. However, the military and political instability in Croatia, its problems, and the balkanization imposed on it still prevent its full integration and recognition as a part of ME.

3. The Problem of Croatia

Owing to the war in Croatia which is not the result of ethnic conflict but of aggression on the part of Serbia, the Federal Army and a fraction of the Serbian population of Croatia (manipulated into joining the aggression), the international recognition of Croatia, although inevitable, will require more effort and time.

4. The NATO Pact

The geographical position of some member states of NATO such as Italy and Greece although seemingly unfavourable, presents no hindrance in a period of neo-detente. For Slovenia and partly for Croatia the closeness of NATO member states is beneficent because NATO is a bulwark against bolshevism and one of the significant integrating factors in Europe.

5. Austria - a New Type of Neutrality

The neutrality of present-day Austria differs from that of the Cold War period because Austria now has a strong political interest in a stable immediate neighbourhood.

6. The New United Germany:

The unification of Germany has been misrepresented by Serbia as leading to expansionism and the wish to create a "Fourth Reich" which would allegedly include Slovenia and Croatia. This should in turn justify the struggle of Serbia and Montenegro against the government of Croatia which is labelled "Neofascist" and "Ustasoid". In other words it is right to take from Croatia territories populated by Serbs, but also those inhabited by Croats and thus prevent the spreading of "Neofascism" to the south-east.

7. Slovenia as a Buffer Zone:

Situated between Central Europe and the generally unstable Balkans, Slovenia can be seen as clearly a buffer state. Thanks to this Austria and Italy have no direct borders with the southeastern territory plagued by Serbia's aggression against the territories and resources of Croatia and its struggle for a Great Serbia.

8. The Friendly (Co-operative) States Bordering with Croatia and Serbia

a) AJ - members of the Alpen Adria Community (also including part of Germany)

b) a, b, c, d - the neighbourhood of Italy, Austria, Slovenia and Hungary is generally very favourable for Croatia.

9. Geopolitical Division:

The line dividing the Balkans from Central Europe, in other words the stable and secure part of Europe from its unstable and insecure part. The present pro-

blems of Croatia are only temporary. This is why it must in principle be considered as part of the Central European and Mediterranean cultural sphere.

10. Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina:

a) BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA which represents a potentially offensive nucleus and together with Serbia constitutes the other geopolitical sphere bordering with Croatia.

b) CROATS - the existence of a clearly Croatian ethnic sphere in one segment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina hinterland is favourable for Croatia.

11. Situation on the Adriatic

On the Adriatic coast the Federal Army holds Boka Kotorska as the most secure and favourable strategic point in the south-east; the island Vis (I) and the harbour of Pula (II) are points on the mainland from which the navy can conduct operations against Croatia.

12. The Contact with Islam:


a) Croatia's contact with the western most compact autochthonous Islamic region in Europe (the Bihac-Cazin region)

b) A practically uninterrupted Islamic zone runs from the Bihac-Cazin region down the entire territory of Yugoslavia, including western Macedonia.

13. The Great Serbia

a) The outline of a moderate version of Great Serbia; apart from Serbia and Montenegro (as the hard core of Great Serbia) it includes Bosnia-Herzegovina which is included as a matter of course into every Great Serbian solution of the Yugoslav crisis.

b) After the referendum held in Macedonia in September 1991 in which the citizens of Macedonia voted for a sovereign and independent state, the militants of Great Serbia can



R. Pavić - IX '91.

no more automatically consider Macedonia merely as "Southern Serbia".

14. Imperialism:

The pretensions of Serbia and Montenegro on Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina territories.

15. The Position of Macedonia:

a) The geopolitical position of Macedonia is very unfavourable owing to the claims of Albania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria: Albania is not satisfied with the status of its national minority in Macedonia (in 1984, 19,8%), for Great Serbia Macedonia is merely

"South Serbia", while Bulgaria and Greece do not recognize the existence of the Macedonian nation.

b) As a result of the outcome of the Macedonian referendum regarding its independence and sovereignty, it is logical to expect a strengthening of

political ties between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.

16. The Albanian-Serbian Problem:

With respect to the problem of the Albanians in Serbia and their just claims for their own Republic of Kosovo, a possible war between the Serbian and Albanian states represents a great danger for the Balkans and all of Europe.

17. The Opening-Up of Albania:

a) States suddenly opening towards the West

b) In order to achieve any kind of material cooperation between Croatia and Albania (which are natural partners) it must not be forgotten that contact can only be made by sea, and this would be prevented by the Federal Navy.

18. Barrier against Islam

At present there is a tendency for a mutual strengthening of ties between Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece, with the aim of forming a barrier against the Islamic "threat" which exists not in Turkey and Albania alone, but in Greece and Bulgaria as well. It is necessary to consider the strong ties which exist between state and church in Serbia and Montenegro.

19. Ideological Framework

The states with a socialist system (overt or covert) are potential, perhaps already actual ideological allies vis-à-vis Central Europe. Developing traffic lines but also owing to geopolitical continuity, the former USSR can reach the Adriatic Sea even without passing the straits of Istanbul. This may become a need, because of the fact that Italy and Greece are members of NATO and that Albania has completely turned to the West, which could completely block the USSR's free passage into the Mediterranean. However, after the practical dissolution of the USSR and the change of its ideological orientation, this political-ideological-territorial framework is not probable. The combination with Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria remains.

"geopolitical horseshoe" is at its narrowest (barely 47 km), and where along the Bosnian/Herzegovinian border the Serbian ethnicum is located, forming the "soft underbelly" of Croatia - that Croatia is in direct contact with a strong Muslim enclave, but perceives it as no danger. Croatia is, further, a contact area to the potential ideological alliance, along with the established contiguity, among Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, Ukraine and Russia which provides a maritime link circumventing the straits of Istanbul. All in all, the intra-Yugoslav contact position of Croatia is twofold. On the one hand, the contact with Slovenia is favourable since it makes possible the only (even in war times) reliable logistical link to the rest of Europe. This is partly true of Croatian-Hungarian border, but it is not at all impossible for everything to be closed by the federal army of occupation in case of a further intensification of the already practically implemented military coup.

In contrast to Croatia, the geopolitical position of Slovenia has always been substantially more favourable. Whereas on the one hand it is important for Croatia always to emphasize the historical role of Croatia as contact, link and outer wall, the position of Slovenia is different. It made use of fruitful civilizational contacts with both the German and Mediterranean spheres (the latter being also true of Croatia). However, and this is invaluable, Slovenia was always outside the scope of Turkish penetration and destruction. Also and of paramount importance for the present circumstances Slovenia was spared the pressure of migration movements from the South-East, which means that it was not subjected to Serbian and Vlachian pressures from the Slavic areas and so did not change its ethnic composition. This, in turn, spared Slovenia those problems that are particularly plaguing Croatia nowadays. Resulting from this is the very compact ethnic make-up of Slovenia, with Slovenes accounting for 90.5% of the population (1981 census). Another favourable circumstance is that Slovenia is a natural entity fitting between Italy, Austria and Hungary, in the beneficent contact position

Survivors from Dalj, photo by *Večernji list*Dalj - Friendship, photo by *Večernji list*

among the Alpine, Mediterranean, Panonian, and Balkanic regions. It is further important as a space ensuring that the turbulent Balkans do not have a direct border with Europe. This means that Slovenia also has a buffer function which is an important factor favouring Slovenia's recognition as a state before long.

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

In intra-Yugoslav geopolitical terms, the relationship of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) is of particular importance. Both republics make a geopolitical unity which, however, is no synonym for any Croatian designs on B-H. The

relation between Croatia and B-H is very specific and may be viewed from two aspects. *First*, it looks as if Croatia, because of its shape of "geopolitical horseshoe", encircles B-H, which may be unfavourable for the latter. This, however, is a mere illusion as Croatia in no sense endangers the other republic and has no territorial claims on it. *Second*, in a case of instrumentalization of B-H on the part of Great-Serbs and the federal army, B-H may be given the role of an attack base in a war against Croatia (which is what is just happening now). It is exactly B-H now that is significantly contributing toward the encirclement of Croatia. In this, B-H offers important advantages because the action against Croatia uses internal, and consequently shorter, operational routes, with the entire territory of the republic of B-H serving as the logistical rear.

Internal Geopolitical Division of Yugoslavia

An essential property of the present Yugoslavia is that, even while it still is (though only formally) an integral state, it is characterized by a fundamental internal geopolitical division into a West and an East. What we have here is in fact a form of continuation of relations from the cold-war period, when Yugoslavia as an integral state was ranged on this, western side of the Iron Curtain. This curtain used to pass right through the centre of Europe and it respected national borders. However, in the current circumstances of the neodetente the situation is completely different: the dividing line between the West and the East has moved significantly eastward, and it does not respect state borders any longer. So, in Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia can be considered parts of the West proper, though war and some sort of balkanization have been temporarily imposed upon Croatia.

Consequently it is possible to conclude the following: Croatia is presently both a contact and a buffer area, itself belonging to both Central Europe and the Mediterranean, whereas the characteristics of the Balkans and the processes of balkanization have been forced upon it as part of the imperialistic aspirations of Serbia aiming at the establishment of a Great Serbia.

NEW STRATEGIES

by **Zdravko Mršić**,
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia

The resolution of the constitutional and political crisis in Yugoslavia has always been a very complicated and difficult task. Now, the war which rages in Croatia, has dramatically worsened the situation, and made the solution more difficult.

Eight constituent parts of Yugoslavia, six republics and two autonomous regions, owing to their specific geographic positions, ethnic characters, national histories and natural resources, have such divergent national interests that it is unrealistic to expect, that the Yugoslavs themselves could find a new formula either for living in a newly constituted country or for a peaceful disintegration of the existing state.

Yugoslavia was conflict-prone from its inception. The political conflicts among the constituents of pre-war Yugoslavia were so intense that the King had to introduce dictatorship in order to suppress them. The second World War unleashed the suppressed conflicts and turned them into massacres. In post-war Yugoslavia, Tito, as the uncontested leader, used his personal rule to prevent the conflict of ethnic and national interests from appearing in public by keeping them within the confines of the Communist Party which was under his full control.

Foreign powers, which could have helped and assisted in finding a feasible solution, have not had even a proper and realistic understanding of the local situation and problems. Precisely because of their lack of complete understanding of the situation, they have insisted that a resolution has to be found by the Yugoslavs themselves.

The course of events has proved that the Yugoslavs alone cannot find a solution which will both last and ensure peace and integration in Europe. Equally, a solution imposed by the foreign powers even if it were fully agreed among themselves, but

not accepted as a permanent solution by the peoples of the individual republics and autonomous regions - would create new frictions and tensions and therefore potentially lead to new confrontations which could spread even outside of Europe.

Any feasible solution which is to ensure a lasting peace on the Balkan peninsula and a stable and harmonious integration of Europe, is to be an outcome of negotiations by the Yugoslavs themselves under the auspices of the EEC (with the consent of the USA), endorsed and ratified by the Parliaments of all present Yugoslav republics and autonomous regions. One should assume that a proper verification and endorsement of such an agreement by all the republics and autonomous regions, would possibly require new elections in all constituent parts, as the political environment and the position of political forces have dramatically changed, because of various factors, a major one being the war currently raging in Croatia.

The new position which should be taken by Croatia regarding the whole crisis is, as of now, determined by the following factors:

1. The whole set of well-rehearsed traditional arguments for the preservation of a united and unitary Yugoslavia has lost its credibility; a new formula for constitutional arrangements on the Balkans peninsula has to be found. Even the justification for a transitional solution of a reconstituted Yugoslavia, with more political and economic autonomy for the republics has lost its ground. Many politicians have argued that the integrity of Yugoslavia has to be preserved in order to discourage the attempt of disintegration of Soviet Union before German reunification could be achieved. The reunification has already been achieved, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union has already started.

2. The war imposed on Croatia has definitely destroyed the foundation on which a kind of common life between Serbia and Croatia can be organized. It has made the whole concept of Yu-

goslavia highly questionable, as it is rightly assumed that Serbo-Croatian relations are of a critical importance for any arrangement within Yugoslavia.

3. The war with its political consequences asks for a reconsideration of the doctrines and strategies of political forces in all eight constituents of a rapidly disintegrating Yugoslavia.

4. The role of the Federal Army in the present war, in which it has sided with the Serbian terrorists and used them, has demonstrated its real character and discredited the entire concept of common or joint armed forces in the Yugoslav republics, without which a joint

owns. The assumptions for the economic and political balance which has been achieved in Europe over thirty years of the cold war and the East-West confrontation are not valid any more. They have been replaced by new political and economic realities.

As far as Croatia's role in finding a solution for the Yugoslav problem is concerned, it has to be emphasized that the citizens of Croatia in all walks of life have serious doubts about the way the state's business is run. Several major strategic errors have been made by the present leaders, and, as a consequence, the electorate's confi-



Croatia in the world's perspective, design by Boris Ljubičić

or common state cannot exist.


5. The failure of economic reforms in Yugoslavia - as they were wrongly conceived as the means for the solution of the political, social and constitutional crisis that loomed over Yugoslavia and as they have been considered for too long by too many politicians and institutions as the only hope for the survival of Yugoslavia - has made the individual republics determined to develop their own specific protective economic models in order to prepare themselves for a possible integration with Europe.

6. The pace and shape of European integration are a process, which was uncertain even before the destruction of Eastern block, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the explosion of Yugoslavia. The new European architecture includes, without any doubt, a set of political and constitutional unkn-

dence that a deal for Croatia will be competently and successfully negotiated, has been considerably eroded.

The issue is even wider. In all major segments of political life the wrong approach with potentially dangerous consequences has been taken. This is why it is realistic to expect that the outcome of the next parliamentary elections will be considerably different from the elections held in April-May 1990. Among the major deficiencies one ought to enumerate the following:


1. A proper democratic political process has not been constituted even among the Croatian population of Croatia. As the result of the electoral system - which has not yet been changed, one political party has dominated over the Parliament. Other parties have been forced to use extraparliamentary activities (being involved in de-



cracy and then led an open aggression, but whose top has been for a too long time spared of all accusation by the Croatian leaders, (5) the issue of Kosovo, which has been tactically treated by the Croatian leadership as an "internal" Serbian issue, whereby more interest in Kosovo has been shown by world leaders and political activists than by Croatian leaders, (6) the issue of Bosnia which was handled to say the least without due clarity of approach, and, finally, (7) the co-operation with Slovenia, has been seriously damaged, to a degree that the gulf between the two countries seemed permanent.

3. The Croatian cause has not been properly taken, presented and discussed with European or world political leaders and institutions. The goals and basic political strategy of Croatia have not been clear. It has not been clear even whether Croatia really wants independence, a so-called "union of states" or confederation. Croatia has not identified in time its allies and has not helped them to help Croatia, although many of them were willing to co-ordinate their actions with Croatia (and Slovenia). The Croatian attitude towards Yugoslav Armed Forces especially confused Croatian friends in Europe. Croatian foreign policy stumbled for a long time on Mr. Marković's reformist deceit, and has done nothing to unmask the essence of Mr. Marković's reforms, and to persuade the West that Yugoslavia will break down on economic grounds, as it has not tackled the political problems (including Kosovo) before undertaking economic and social reforms.

4. The Croatian leaders have underestimated and neglected



Hrvatska Kostajnica

the importance of the question of the Serbian ethnic minority in Croatia. They have been behaving as if the solution of that issue could be brought about through negotiations with Belgrade. The confidence of the majority of the Serbs who lived in Croatia could have been won by the determination of the Croatian leaders to build in Croatia a civic democracy based on the rule of the law, to such a degree that the militant minority among the Serbs would realize that it would not help them if they were used again by a foreign power.

5. Attempts have been made to use the Catholic Church in Croatia for short term political purposes. Under the Communist regime, the Church was the only rallying point for the Croatian people in their effort, not only to preserve human dignity and protect their human rights, but also to save their national identity. The Church should have been left in the background of ephemeral political processes, in order to be preserved as the pillar of the people's fight for survival.

6. Even though the present leaders rallied the support of the ethnic Croats living (and working) abroad for the introduction of a democratic system in Croatia, the ruling party, and even a small group within it, has tried to privatize the communication between emigrants' organizations, much earlier founded in many European and overseas countries, and domestic organizations and institutions. The attempts to misuse already existing cultural societies, centres and missions have created a high level of dissatisfaction among the emigrants.

Croatian official politics is now concentrated on the achievement of two major goals: (1) to turn the course of military operations into at least a partial success, which is necessary to enjoy both the Croatian population's continued support, which had started to dwindle, and the respect of the West, and (2) to gain international recognition for Croatia. A success regarding recognition will be more credible if Croatia can be militarily more successful. Croatian demand for recognition is on the other hand calculated for to improve Croatia's military position.

However, Croatia has not offered to both internal and exter-

nal partners, allies and enemies any tangible plan or procedure which could lead to a lasting resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. There is more to the Yugoslav crisis than just the conflict between Serbian and Croatian leadership. Suffice it to mention the position of the Albanians in Kosovo.

Knowing well both the situation in Yugoslavia and the concerns of the West, I would advise Croatia to support a plan which must take into account the two following assumptions:

1. In order to achieve its own independence, Croatia ought to advise an acceptable resolution of the entire Yugoslav problem,

2. the EEC, the USA and other Western countries need a lengthy period of time to reach their internal consensus regarding the issue of dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The plan consists of the following steps:

1. Immediate recognition by the EEC countries and the USA of all those republics which ask for the recognition;

2. Deferment of the establishment of diplomatic relations with any of the newly recognized states;

3. Immediate financial and material aid to be limited strictly to relief aid, designed to remedy direct consequences of the war in Croatia (orphans, homeless, invalids, basic public services, etc.);

4. Inter-Yugoslav conference under the auspices of the EEC, aimed at finding a lasting solution of the Yugoslav crisis, in accordance with the CSCE principles and the European Charter;

5. New parliamentary elections in all newly recognized states in order to give an opportunity to the populace to express their opinion in the new circumstances, created primarily by the war;

6. Agreement among the new states, acceptable to the EEC (and the USA), which will regulate the dissolution of Yugoslavia, make internal and external balances, including war damages and compensations which will be followed by the establishment of full diplomatic relations and proper economic aid.

7. Possible creation of a new "union of states", on the basis of free decisions of the individual, already fully independent, states.

fense, organizing charities, protest or prayer meetings, etc.). Politics is formally confined to the leading party, which has not constituted a democratic political process even within its own ranks. The leading party runs its business using methods reminiscent of decades of Communist Party rule. The Croatian Parliament was used as a docile voting machine until the session held in August 1991, when the resistance of the majority of deputies of the party in power, who voted against the proposed list of ministers, forced the President to form a coalition government of "democratic unity", de facto forcing his own parliamentary party into opposition.

2. The Croatian leadership has grossly erred in handling the whole set of issues related to Yugoslavia: (1) The Federal Presidency with its composition, as one of six republics has three representatives and others just each, whereby Croatia insisted that the Presidency should be reactivated after it was paralyzed first by the resignation of Serbian representatives, and then by refusal of the Serbian side to accept Mr. Mesić as president, (2) the Federal Government and its reform programme, which was initially supported and subsequently refused after it caused dire consequences for the Croatian economy, (3) the Federal Parliament with its Federal Chamber, whose term has been twice self-extended and which has introduced some of the most damaging legislation packages, (4) the Yugoslav Armed Forces which first showed an aggressive attitude toward the young Croatian demo-

Some of the advantages of the peace plan:

1. Peace will be relatively quickly achieved, as the generals will comprehend that they will in the end lose the war, and the embattled people of Croatia that they will win.

2. Negotiations among the independent states will be smoother and more constructive than if the recognition is not granted.

3. The individual states will not need to contribute to the federal budget, as they will organize finances on their own. The Federal Army, which is one of the main obstacles to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, will lose its financial basis.

4. THE WEST WILL HAVE ENOUGH TIME (DURING INTER-YUGOSLAV NEGOTIATIONS) TO SORT OUT THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES AND FIND A CONSENSUS.

5. Establishment of full diplomatic relations and economic aid can be used to ensure that all Yugoslav negotiating parties adhere to the CSCE principles and the European Charter.

International recognition of Croatia should be the major goal and when achieved it will be a colossal achievement; but in order to ensure a lasting peace on the Balkan peninsula an internal settlement in Croatia must be found. This can be achieved only when (1) an internal democratic political process has been established, (2) a real departure from communist methods and mentality has been realized, and (3) when a full democracy, with proven, convinced and dedicated democrats at the top, has been established. This ought to be done for the sake of the Croatian population, but also for the sake of winning over the ethnic Serbs in Croatia.

The sponsors of the peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia, primarily the EEC countries and the USA, should take into account that, when the resolution of the Serbo-Croatian conflict has been resolved, the problems of Kosovo and Bosnia - part of an overall Muslim problem - will come to the fore if the Albanians and Muslims do not achieve autonomy now. The bridge between Europe and the Muslim world, in which Europe has a vested interest, could be a permanent source of trouble and a constant threat to European integration.

THE ORIGIN OF THE GREATER SERBIAN AGGRESSION

KEY FACTORS IN THE "MEMORANDUM" OF 1986

The document of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences - SANU

by Dušan Bilandžić,
Professor of Political Science, University of Zagreb and former Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia

The *Memorandum* is a document which expounds the Serbian national programme, offering an analysis of the problem of Serbian nationalism from the standpoint of its historical inception. It focuses, however, on the thesis that the Yugoslav Communist movement was essentially against the vital interests of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia. This seems paradoxical because the centralism and unitarianism of Tito's Yugoslavia should have suited Serbia whose national consciousness is dominated by the ideas of a Great Serbia, centralism and dictatorship, all those factors which ensured Serbian national interests throughout the territory of Yugoslavia. This raises the question: why did the *Memorandum* tear down Tito's edifice with such vehemence and passion? It is paradoxical that the *Memorandum* calls for a complete restructuring of the Yugoslav state on the grounds that Serbia as relegated to a position of secondary importance and that therefore, this structure must be destroyed. The crux of this thesis is that already between the Two Wars, the Communist movement in Yugoslavia had proclaimed Serbian leadership, politics and the *Memorandum* claims - the Serbian people as well, hegemonistic, in respect to the rest of Yugoslavia. The Communist movement held that Yugoslavia was a dungeon for its peoples.

The Communist movement believed, that a federal form of government would serve to block the Great Serbian ideology in Yugoslavia. It was with this aim that a federal form of government was established in Jajce, in 1943; however, in 1945 its structure had become so highly centralized that the Republics were in reality only administrative units and not states.

Consequently, all power was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party, in the body called the Politburo. The Politburo is a body which has power similar to that of an absolute monarch in an absolute monarchy. Serbia accepted centralism because it believed that together with a complete concentration of power at the top, which was exercised from Belgrade, it would enable her to achieve its economic, political and all other interests. However, inherent in the federal state, with its republics, was the possibility, however remote, that the republics might one day become states. Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, on the other hand, accepted centralism as a necessary but temporary evil. As a result, at the meeting of the federal party leadership on 12th and 13th of November in 1965 it was decided, on the basis of a project prepared by Tito and Kardelj, that the centralist government of Yugoslavia would be reconstructed to strengthen the power of the Republics as well as of the autonomous provinces within Serbia. This is an interesting document, which has certain implications for the *Memorandum*.

At this meeting Kardelj explained that the structure of the Yugoslav state was both the means and the instrument which made the realisation of a

Great Serbian hegemony possible, and that Yugoslavia, unless it took steps to change the centralist government would only become the name for a Great Serbia. These were the factors underlying the constitutional reform of the Federation that was undertaken in 1971. At that time a circle of intellectuals gathered around the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, together with the leading Serbian intellectuals and issued a document in which they state that the 1971 constitutional reform of the federation was a covertly anti-Serbian act which was transforming Yugoslavia into a loose federation. They further stated that such a course of development in Yugoslavia would leave 40 per cent of the Serbs outside of Serbia, which would result in their becoming a minority in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Kosovo, if that reforms were carried out.

At that time a group of Serbian intellectuals put forward a plan to forestall such a reconstruction of the federation, and in case that proved impossible, Slovenia and part of Croatia should be severed from Yugoslavia, and a Great Serbia would be created under the name of Yugoslavia already in 1971. However, as Tito had absolute power at that time, the group was stopped and its chief idealist, the philosopher Djuric, sentenced to two years of imprisonment. The Constitution of 1974 introduced elements of confederation in a two instruments: the first one is the republics' right of veto of any decision made at the federal level. The second instrument is the formation of all federal bodies on the basis of parity.

As Tito had absolute power he made certain that this con-

stitution was passed. This shows that at that time there was a tendency towards a confederation. Nevertheless, in 1976 the Serbian Communist Party and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, produced the so called *Blue Book*, demanding a revision of the 1974 Constitution with respect to two points. One demanded diminishing the autonomy of the Provinces, the other that the two confederative elements, the right of veto and parity, be diminished. This document of the proposals of Serbia's revision of the 1974 Constitution, was presented to Tito who rejected it. Upon Tito's death, Serbia put into motion the great political initiative to revise the Constitution; this was done by the Serbian political leadership, not the Academy. Between 1981 and 1985, for five years in all, Serbia negotiated with the other Republics. However, no Republic would accept revision. Why did Serbia negotiate? It was bound by the 1974 Constitution, which allowed changes in the constitution to be made only if consensus was reached. As the Serbian political leadership was unsuccessful in this, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences formed its own commission and acted against both the Serbian political leadership and the other Republics. The thesis was:

a) As a result of the Constitution of 1974, Yugoslavia was broken up into feudal parts which were under the dictatorship of various leaderships. The Serbian national state was split into three states: Kosovo, Vojvodina and Serbia proper, which in the view of the Serbian Academy was equal to an occupation of Serbia. In reality we must admit that the Provinces did function almost as states. In formal legal terms they were practically excluded from Serbia.

b) The second thesis was that the Serbs living outside of Serbia, who comprised 40 per cent of all Serbs, had already become an ethnic minority without any rights. It further stated that the Serbs in Croatia had no rights. This did not take into account the fact that 12.2 per cent of the Serbs in Croatia held 30 per cent of the top positions in it. Also, it stated that the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Academy considered to be Serbian soil, were under Muslim and Croa-

tian dominance; again, they were without equal rights. Furthermore, the rights of Serbs on Kosovo were also threatened. This led the Serbian Academy to the conclusion that the Constitution of 1974 must be abrogated and Yugoslavia should again be organized along the lines of a highly centralized state.

The *Memorandum* expresses a Serbian political perception, according to which Yugoslavia is actually the national state of the Serbian people. To explain the genesis of this, the Serbian Academy claims that Croats and Slovenes have ruled over Yugoslavia since its foundation. Moreover, it claims that Croats and Slovenes were the dominant political strategists to proclaim the Serbian nation as hegemonistic. It then claims that now is the time for Serbia to finally break this political practice which has been going on for 50-60 years. The *Memorandum* of the Serbian Academy is then the pre-condition for the liquidation of the 1974 Constitution and for the re-centralization of Yugoslavia.

At the same time as the *Memorandum* came out there started a series of meetings in university circles, various associations, on the television and radio, and in the press, where this idea was discussed. It may be said that *Memorandum* was an expression of acute consciousness of almost the whole of Serbian society because this thesis was supported not only by the Academy but also by the Church, the Communist Party and social strata and social organizations.

The rebellion of Albanians in Kosovo was seen by the Serbian people as an attack on the greatest historical holy places, on the Serbian Orthodox religion, on Serbianism, on the cradle of the Medieval Serbian state, and on what is called Holy Kosovo. After the Serbian Academy and the Serbian intelligentsia created this atmosphere, they laid the groundwork for the arrival of one leader at the head of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević who started to implement this programme.

When Milošević came to power, he stopped consultations with the other republics and started to use so-called anti-institutional methods. He organized mass demonstration with hundreds of thousands people

who carried flags and placards saying: "we want arms" and "we want to carry out the national programme given in the *Memorandum*. Milošević then, in 1987, had a chance of success:

1. He had the Pan-Serbian movement in Yugoslavia, which meant that all Serbs in Yugoslavia stood behind the flag of the national programme of the Serbian Academy. As Serbs are spread all over Yugoslavia with 36% of the overall population, he thought that this number could begin to control Yugoslavia.

2. He had the agreement of the Communist Party of the Yugoslavia. This decidedly centralist organization supported the view of Yugoslavia as a unitary state and leaned strongly towards centralism.

3. He had the support of the Army. The Army spiritually, politically and ideologically supported centralism.

4. Furthermore, the Soviet Empire was untouched at the time and the politician or the political movement which relied on the help of the East (the East spreading from Berlin to Vladivostok) could do anything in Yugoslavia because of the backing of a powerful empire. What might appear strange is that the West would not object to such an action either. Why? Because the West had pandered to Yugoslavia, flirted with Yugoslavia as if with a beautiful girl for 40 years, because Tito's Yugoslavia was used to destabilize Soviet politics, and as a relatively independent state was always an attractive example to eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia) of the struggle against Soviet imperialism. This is why the West and especially the USA showed great support for Tito's Yugoslavia, and this support became a myth in the West. This myth needed support, and it could be supported only by a strong state, which was exactly what Serbia wanted.

The preconditions for such a programme existed even inside Yugoslavia with regard to these two factors, the silent support of the West and the open support of the East. Initially Milošević's politics were acceptable to the West, because they carried slogans about getting rid of bureaucracy, and they used the anti-bureaucratic label so they could be seen as the catalyst for the fall of Communism in Yugo-

slavia. Milošević skilfully launched himself as a man who was destroying the old structures, although he was a hard-line communist. At that moment, it looked as though he was attacking the whole of the old structure of Yugoslavia and as though Belgrade was the centre of a democratic movement. Milošević used the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" to break Kosovo and Vojvodina, annexed Montenegro and in 1989 moved against Slovenia and Croatia. However, he did not have enough strength to break Slovenia, and Croatia started coming to its senses. In 1987-1989 an anti-Milošević coalition was formed by all the non-Serb nationalities (Croats, Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians and Slovenes) with the aim of stopping the Serbian aggressive war of conquest against the rest of Yugoslavia.

In the meantime, two things happened, that postponed Milošević's or the *Memorandum's* strategy. Firstly, the whole of Eastern Europe fell in 1989; secondly, there was a great deal of confusion in the Soviet Union with the introduction of Gorbachev's perestroika. This meant that the backing of the East and the Soviet Union disappeared. Also, the West began to cool off, realizing that Milošević's politics were not what they had been hoping for, but that they were really the politics of the preservation of communism in Yugoslavia.

This presented Milošević and the Army with a dilemma: to organize a coup then, in 1988-1989, or to continue torturing Yugoslavia. He decided to continue torturing Yugoslavia, bleeding it dry in order to subjugate it.

After the fall of Eastern Europe, democratic pressures in Slovenia and Croatia made it possible for multi-party elections to be held in these republics. The communist lost power in these elections, as they did later on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro remained as the only communist republics in Yugoslavia. The *Memorandum* strategy changed direction and abandoned the concept of Yugoslavia ruling over the whole of Yugoslavia and accepted that Slovenia should be amputated. This was done because Croatia's position would be weakened by the departure of



Slavonian refugees on the streets of Osijek, photo by *Večernji list*

Slovenia. Macedonia would fall anyway, so if Croatia were crushed, both Bosnia and Macedonia would fall automatically. This is why the Army and the Serbian Government, in close co-operation, organized the rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia. The Army joined the rebellion and this is how the war in Croatia started.

In this outline it can be seen that the *Memorandum* is a direct continuation of the traditional Greater Serbian movement starting from Garašanin, Pašić and Draža Mihajlović. Milošević continued where

Draža Mihajlović and the Chetnik movement in World War II stopped, and is now trying to achieve what the Serbian national programme has been planning for the last 150 years.

Serbia is repeating its history. It is repeating its history in the sense that today's generation has to continue the programme of the generations died at Slivnica, Bregalnica, Kajmakčalan, and in the Bosnian mountains under the leadership of Draža Mihajlović. The essence of the *Memorandum* is to carry out the programme of previous generations of Serbs.

THE OMINOUS DOCTRINE OF A DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR

AN ANSWER TO PROFESSOR MIHAILO MARKOVIĆ

by Professor
Vjekoslav Mikecin,
University of Zagreb

Marković in the steps
of the Chetnik
ideologue Moljević

Professor Marković's Greater Serbian eros, almost as intense as the one in Baja Pašić and Stevan Moljević, seems to have completely suppressed all reason and sobriety in this "greatest Serbian philosopher".

A distinguished member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), Dr. Mihailo Marković - besides Dr. Bora Jović the top man in the still ruling Serbian Socialist Party, the man whom his circles claim to be "greatest Serbian philosopher of the present days" - has recently disclosed (see his two-part interview published in *Politika*, August 30th and August 31st, 1991) in quite open and explicit terms the true motives and aims behind the aggressive war, which has been waged jointly by the Serbian officialdom and the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) against the Republic of Croatia and the entire Croatian people, the war of which he himself has been both a promoter and a strategist. Thus Professor Mihailo Marković enters irrevocably and forever - a dark, infamous figure - into the history and memory of the Croatian people.

This professor, this dignitary, this "greatest Serbian philosopher of the present", this "widely acclaimed humanist" thus says: "What is of prime importance now is to set a new border between Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia as soon as possible (...) The JNA ought to be situated along this new border, so that we can defend this new border and prevent any bloodshed" (cf. *Vjesnik*, August 23rd, 1991).

Preventing bloodshed is, however, not his intention, but rather territorial conquest even through bloodshed, if need be, since Professor Marković, in effect the main ideologue of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, envisages this new border very much like his notorious predecessor, the Chetnik ideologue and "vojvoda" Stevan Moljević along exactly those borders on the Croatian territory where the JNA is at the moment stationed or intends to be stationed.

Professor Marković, namely, goes on to suggest: "The only way to prevent new bloodshed is to place the military units of the JNA at this new border, alongside the already existing volunteer units, the units of territorial defence and the militia forces of Krajina, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Eastern Slavonia, Western Srem and Baranja. SERBIA MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TOWARDS STABILIZING SUCH BORDERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE..." (the emphasis mine).

And in the above mentioned interview in *Politika*, Mr. Marković, the strategist of the Greater Serbian project perfidiously counsels that the army should be used in such a way that the role of Serbia as the aggressor remain invisible to the world.

"At this moment", says the Professor, "while the war conflict continues on the territory of Croatia, it is in the foremost Serbian national interest that the Republic of Serbia conduct its strategy of protecting the Serbian people within Croatia in such a way as to avoid being accused of aggression against

the Republic of Croatia in the eyes of the world (...) It is in our vital interest that the protection of the Serbian people in Croatia will be carried out by the Yugoslav Federal Army whose responsibility it is according to our laws as well as according to international standards." (*Politika*, August 30th, 1991)

In this interview he goes on to say: "Yugoslavia has to establish its new state border, because at this moment we must be the only country in the world which does not have its state border on a large part of its territory. This new state border, in Croatia, must follow the line between the Serbian and Croatian people. The JNA must be stationed at this new border and prevent further attacks by the state and paramilitary terrorists on the unprotected civilian population. After that we can talk about the final solution." (*Politika*, August 31st, 1991)

As we can see from these quotations, Professor Marković - the authoritative proponent of the official Serbian ideology - states openly that there is a silent agreement about close cooperation and co-ordination of action between the JNA, the Government of Serbia and the well-organized and well-armed (by the army and Serbia) extremists, irredentist Serbian groups in Croatia, i.e. the agreement about the use of the army for the occupation of Croatia, violent conquest and amputation of Croatian territory for the benefit of Greater Serbia.

Professor Marković belongs to a largish group of members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences which has been interested in Croatia (especially in enlisting the support of Serbs in Croatia and strategically positioning them for the benefit of Greater Serbian politics) and everything connected with Croatia for years. Members of the Academy feel great concern for the allegedly terrible fate of the Serbs in Croatia (the scenario already tried in Kosovo) and for the fate of Croatia in general, of course. These honourable members of the Academy would like to decide what is going to happen to Croatia, what Croatia may or may not do, how large its territory is or is allowed to be, whether it did or did not have its own state, its own history,

literature (or whether that literature is also Serbian), in short, whether Croatia is at all a relevant historical, cultural, and geographical fact. The absurd discourse of these heinous obtruders.

All these and similar things would be worthy of mighty Gargantuan laughter if they did not imply, in the mythic and megalomaniac environment of such as Greater Serbian bazaar, a series of dangerous fallacies and deceptions with very concrete and awful consequences.

Strange breed, these members of SANU

These members of SANU are indeed a strange breed. It is, namely, difficult to find anywhere in modern, politically mature nations a national, scientific institution of the highest rank involved in anything even remotely resembling the activities of SANU, where political projects and tactics are being devised and collective, ill-founded political pamphlets composed (such as, for example, the famous SANU *Memorandum*), directed against the legitimate rights of entire nations. One would indeed have to search far and wide across the globe to find another national academy of arts and sciences which would readily take over the role of ideological or propagandistic state apparatuses with the intention of denying whole chapters in the history of other nations or, in turn, laying claims to their culture, language, etc.

Recently, our colleague Professor Mihailo Marković, a philosopher and an academy member, has done more than openly joining forces with these militant and often dangerously biased members of the Serbian Academy, among which the "experts" for Croatia such as Pavle Ivić, Antonije Isaković, Dejan Medaković, Dobrica Ćosić, Vasilije Krestić, Mihajlo Pantić etc. distinguish themselves most particularly. As of late, Professor Marković has taken the lead in this group of new Greater Serbian ideologues by publishing in *Politika* of August 30th and 31st, 1991 a most significant, programmatic text-interview, which is in effect a veritable Magna Carta of the actual Serbian state politics. What this text proclaims in a brutal and a brutally straightforward way, shying at nothing from mystifi-

cations to twisting of facts, from half-truths to downright lies (and Professor Marković calls himself a scientist!), combining all these in turn with the pretence of learning, primitive arrogance as well as with an ignorance of historical facts, is an allegedly new, complete and pan-Serbian project. What it proclaims in actual fact is the same old Greater Serbian national strategy founded on the traditions of Serbian church orthodoxy and its state expansionism.

Moreover, this text appears at a time which may easily be the most difficult in the history of Croatia, at a time when our children, our sons, our wives and our old people are being killed every day, when whole villages, communications and transportation systems, when our cathedrals and cultural monuments are being viciously destroyed. And all these atrocities find their inspiration and theoretical legitimation as well as their directions in this text. Where are you headed, my dear Professor?

In other, more normal times, this text by Professor Marković would not merit even superficial interest, let alone a commentary. But the times are not normal. A dirty war has been waged against Croatia by the joint forces of the JNA and of official Serbia, a war which has found its theorist, strategist and ideologue precisely in the person of Professor Marković, Vice-President of the Socialist Party of Serbia, a neo-Bolshevik party in which people like Jović and Marković abound these days, and in the ranks of which rages again the revived and degenerated Greater Serbian hegemony with its merciless, brutal, perfidious and bloodthirsty methods - known only too well and for too long in these Croatian parts.

My dear Professor Marković, here in Croatia, from Gospić to Otočac, from Petrinja and Hrvatska Kostajnica to Sarvaš and Vukovar, from Jasenice and Krušovo to Vrlika and Sinj, everywhere people get killed every day; here in Croatia young men, almost boys - workers, schoolboys, students, my students defending their homeland and her innocent civilians - whom you and your propagandists call Ustashi legionaries - are dying at the hand of your snipers and your insane mass-murderers,

while you and your acolytes from that, so distant Belgrade keep issuing commands (and I quote) "to set a new border between Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia as soon as possible (...)". This new border of yours, Professor Marković, should turn even my native coastal town, Novigrad - which is more than 400 miles removed from Serbia - into a Serbian town on the "Serbian coast" (as the Knin dentist and irredentist Milan Babić has repeatedly announced). O tempora, o mores!

Pathological hatred

God be with you Mr. Professor! Let me remind you that aggressors who were much more skilful and powerful have not succeeded in taking this coast away from the Croats for centuries. Let us hope that neither you nor your assistants will succeed.

In Mr. Mihailo Marković's text-interview there are more similar jewels which should be taken out and briefly commented on to show the complete irrationality, absurdity and even chauvinist narrow-mindedness of this member of the Academy.

Professor Marković in his boundless, almost pathological hatred for everything that is Croatian wants to use Serbs in Croatia in a totally dishonourable way. While hypocritically pretending to be worried over their terrible fate, and really interested in expanding the Greater Serbian plans for Croatia, he twists facts with ease and claims that "the Serbian people in Croatia" have been "deprived of all rights" since the war.

Professor Marković, this statement of yours will be declined as untruth by every even slightly objective citizen of Croatia.

While now, says Mr. Marković, the Serbian people's "very existence is threatened after the extremist ustashoid nationalists came to power in Croatia."

The whole of this structure was necessary to Professor Marković to come to this imperative Greater Serbian conclusion: "This people (i.e. the Serbs) ... will never live within the framework of a Croatian state. For this principal reason Yugoslavia cannot be a union of states in their present borders." (*Politika*, August 31st, 1991).

Whether or not the Serbs will be living in Croatia - this will probably not be decided by Professor Marković, or by his exclusive and apodeictic precepts.

Mr. Marković is trying very hard to prove that Yugoslav internal borders between the republics are provisional and administrative and that the Croatian people do not have the right to their sovereign state within today's borders of the republic. Let us hear his fabulation which is not worthy of a philosophiae doctor and a member of an academy. His arguments are typical of certain members of SANU when non-Serbian peoples on Southern Slav territories are in question. If need be, facts can be falsified, which is exactly what Marković does.

We shall state a long quotation because it illustrates the depth of Croatian disputes with Greater Serbian ideas and actions.

"Present internal borders in Yugoslavia can be legitimate only if they are based on ethnic and historical foundations. Krajina, eastern Slavonia and western Srem cannot belong to Croatia according to either of these criteria. These territories have been inhabited by a Serbian majority for centuries. Croatia has not had its state borders since 1102 (...) and within the framework of Austria-Hungary it always consisted of Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia. In 1918 the state of Serbia and Montenegro united with the peoples (Croatian, Slovene and Serbian) who lived also on the southern territories of the fallen Austria-Hungary - but not THE STATES of Croatia and Slovenia. Therefore, Croatian leaders can only claim the NDH borders, the Independent State of Croatia in WW II, (which no wise man would do) or the borders which were arbitrary drawn by Tito, Kardelj, Ranković and Dilas." (*Politika*, August 31st, 1991)

Two comments must be added here. The first refers to Marković's twisting of facts in regards to population. Namely, it is not true that "the Serbian people have lived as a majority people for centuries" on the above mentioned territories. The truth is somewhat different. According to the latest census (as well as the previous one 10 years ago), on the territory of

eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem there are 62% Croats and 23% Serbs (without taking into account the county of Županja where there are 88% Croats).

As far as the second question is concerned - the status of the Croatian state and statehood through history, in the first instance it should only be said that professor Marković is treading unfamiliar ground, just as he obviously does not know Croatian political history at all. I suggest that he stick to the good old proverb - look before you leap.

Professor Mihailo Marković is known in philosophical circles

as an excellent logician and a strict analyst. Unfortunately, in the interview on which we have commented here there is no trace of the characteristics mentioned. Greater Serbian eros in Professor Marković, which is almost as strong as the one in Baja Pašić and Stevan Moljević, completely suppressed reason and sobriety in this "greatest Serbian philosopher."

I dare say that these megalomaniac and ominous projects, which call for violent conflicts, mutual extermination and revenge, carry the greatest damage to the honour and good name of Serbia and of the Serbian people.

We would like to say in the end that these distorted views and theories of Professor Marković, which unfortunately have succeeded in materializing in the worst possible way even in this destructive war on our Croatian soil, these views and theories from which our people are suffering so much, we wish that they become a challenge mainly to Serbian intellectuals, and to other people, to raise their voice of protest against the terrible evil which has struck us all. ●

THE POSITION OF THE SERBS IN CROATIA

A VIEW ON THE PROPOSALS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE SERB QUESTION IN CROATIA

by **Božo Kovačević**,
*Vice-President of the
Croatian Liberal Party
(HSL)*

In July 1991 a task force of the Commission for the protection and the promotion of equality between nations and ethnic communities of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia worked out a draft concerning the basis for the implementation of cultural autonomy, Local government and self-government and a proportionate participation of Serbs and other nationalities in the governing of the Republic of Croatia. The topics mentioned were dealt with by groups of experts. A Legal Commission has the task to formulate the material discussed into a bill which would then pass through regular procedures to become law. Until this law is passed, the political status of Serbs in Croatia will not be regulated. This, however, is one of the conditions for the Republic of Croatia to be both democratic and recognized in its integrity by the parliaments and governments of European and other democratic countries.



Banja - Where does the evil come from?, photo by *Večernji list*

This is also the condition for the Serbs in Croatia to recognize its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which means to recognize it as their state.

The problem will partly be solved through the constitutional provisions endorsing the equality of all citizens. This regulation ought to be insisted upon. There is no reason why the Serb question should be separated from the question of

other minorities. All minority problems ought to be settled on two levels:

a) by guaranteeing, on the level of the republic, an unobstructed development of the cultural particularities of every minority (financing education in its language, folklore, publishing, etc.)

b) To guarantee through the Local Self-government Law that on the local level, in the municipi-

palties where some minority has a relative or absolute majority, the language of that minority should be the official language side by side with Croatian; apart from the right guaranteed and financed by the Republic, every minority must have the right to establish - on its own, independently of government support-institutions for the satisfaction of the needs of its members. Also, the Local Self-government Law should allow the local authorities control over the local police and at the same time guarantee the protection and the implementation of rights to the group which constitutes the majority in the Republic, but is a minority in the local community; thereby the principle of subordination to and of respecting the laws of the Republic has to be secured.

I do not think that it is in accordance with the principles of liberal democracy and the principle of political equality of all citizens to insist upon a proportionate ethnic representation in parliament. The proportionate electoral system regulates the relationships between political parties and not ethnic minorities. The Local Self-government Law guarantees the rule of the minority in those areas where its members constitute the majority of the population. The Electoral Law must guarantee the right of every minority to a seat in Parliament, even if none of its mem-

bers should come into Parliament on the basis of election results.

As for a special status for the minorities - and in the case of Croatia this applies to the Serbs - I do not think that this can be granted. In areas where the Serbian population is homogeneous they hardly make 4-5% of the total population in Croatia. Except for the rights guaranteed by the Local Self-government Law and the Electoral Law as well as by the Constitution there is no reason for these areas to be given additional rights which, as a matter of fact, have not been awarded to any similar minority group in Europe. If it is also pointed out that the Government of the Republic of Croatia is ready to accept all the internationally accepted documents regulating minority rights and is ready to enable international monitoring missions to control the implementation of these rights, then the need for any special minority status disappears.


The position of the Serbs in Croatia cannot be compared with the position of Albanians in the Kosovo region. There, the Albanians make up almost 90% of the population, which amounts about 25% of the total number of inhabitants within the Republic of Serbia. They therefore must have a special status and the right to a Republic. ●

SERB HOMELAND

by Milan Đukić,
President of the Serbian People's Party with headquarters in Zagreb

It is now of greatest importance that we distinguish two different realities in everything that is happening in Croatia. Europe and the world are to understand these events. First and foremost, we must separate Serbian aggression in Croatia from the unresolved nationalist problems and the position of Serbs in Croatia. The objective of the aggressor, embodied in the bolshevik politics

of Slobodan Milošević, which has drawn parts of the Yugoslav army and some of the Serbs in Croatia into this conflict, for its own expansionist interests, is to conquer part of Croatian territory with the aim of creating a "Great Serbia". Serbia would thus gain Slavonia and Baranja, which are major sources of food, and by extending across Baranja, Kordun, Lika and the Dalmatian Hinterland, it would gain access to the key highways leading the Adriatic Coast. The protagonists in this aggression are not interested in the problems and the rights of Serbs in Croatia, they are not interested in Serbs in Croatia at all.



Zagreb - Stop the crime, photo by *Večernji list*

Two arguments support these claims: one is that except for the usual statement, that the Serbs in Croatia do not have the most elementary human rights, nobody in Bolshevik politics, ever put on paper those rights that the Serbs in Croatia do not have nor were any such demands regarding their rights ever put to the Croatian political leadership, which is the only body to which such demands should be directed. The second argument is that, even if the so-called Serbian Provinces were to become part of Serbia, Serbs in Croatia would continue to remain in Croatia live on the territories which are now occupied. Where is the solution today?

Only in the move of the parliaments and governments of European and other democratic nations to do everything in their power to stop the aggression in Croatia and even beyond. This is necessary so that the Croatian people can realize their right to self-determination, along with all the guarantees of the rights of the minorities in Croatia, without which there can be no independence nor acceptance in the European Community of nations. Part of the responsibility for the conflict lies with the Croatian political leadership which was incapable of finding the means to dispel the fears of the 12.5% strong Serbian minority in Croatia. The war must end. All those taking part in the aggression will have to accept a peaceful solution and dialogue; many have already realized that the objectives of the Great Serbian politics remain unfulfilled.

There can be no small Yugoslavia, and even less so Great Serbia. Serbs in Croatia will not leave their homeland; they recognize Croatia's sovereignty and territorial rights, and they will at the same time use every democratic means to fight for the same civil and human rights which other citizens of Croatia have. Thus nobody will be able to say "Serbs will be given or have been given more rights than others." Nobody can give anybody anything when it comes to human and civil rights. They are inalienable from birth and part of everyone's historical heritage. In a democratic state we all simply have them; they are not given to us by anybody. This is how Serbs and Croats will continue to live together and build their future.

WHY I RAISE MY VOICE

by Professor
Olga Carević,
University of Zagreb

I was born in Novi Sad where I finished Elementary and High school. After the war in 1945 I enrolled in Zagreb University where I graduated and got my Ph.D. degree in biochemistry. I pursued further my studies in cellular biochemistry at the University of Birmingham, England. I worked at the Veterinary Faculty, in the Ruđer Bošković Institute, in the Health Care Institute of the City of

Zagreb and lectured as Professor at the Post-graduate Centre of Zagreb University. I have collaborated with many research institutions, e.g. with the International Institute of Cellular and Molecular Pathology in Brussels, especially with the Nobel prize winner Prof. Dr. Christian de Duve, as well as with researchers from Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and the U.S.A. I have published numerous scientific papers, participated at many Congresses and obtained recognition for my work, both in my country and abroad.

Although I have never been actively engaged in politics and have never been a member of any political party, the disastrous course of events in Croatia turned my attention to problems that I have never supposed I would preoccupy myself with. As a member of the Croatian Pugwash group (Pugwash is a city in Canada where the First

Pugwash Conference was held in 1957) I believe that misunderstandings between Serbs and Croats in Croatia could be resolved by peaceful and democratic means, without the usage of arms, all the more so as the coexistence of all people in this territory has always been founded on the principles of tolerance and mutual respect. The Knin rebellion, supposedly an expression of dissatisfaction with the fact that the Serbs have been defined by the Constitution as a minority group and not as a national community should not have happened because this problem could have been solved through the institutions of the system.

Some time after the beginning of the Serbian protests which were expressed by inappropriate means, I realized that the "Serbian uprising" was really a consequence of the long-term policy imported from Serbia which was started by Slobodan Milošević, among others. This made me write a letter "The Friendship Between Croats and Serbs and Vice Versa" which was published in *Vjesnik* on August 18th 1990, in Zagreb. In this letter, I as a Serb publicly distanced myself from the statement made by the then Chairman of the Municipal Council of Knin, Dr. Milan Babić, about the great imminent threat to the Serbs in Croatia which he made in front of the then President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dr. Borisav Jović. I also wrote "that there would have been fewer misunderstanding if the leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) had legally put forward their options and made their critical remarks on the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the Croatian Assembly instead of attending the Assembly of Serbs in Srb." When I started writing my letters I spoke in my name only, but later, when many Serbs and Croats supported me publicly, it seemed to me that I was writing in their name too.

As my letters had a positive echo in Croatian public life, I received many offers from various political parties to join them and I was even offered a position in the Croatian Government. Although I was honoured by such offers I had to decline them as I had all my life worked exclusively in the field of natu-

NO SOLUTION OF YUGOSLAV CRISIS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

The President of the Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF) in Croatia, Milorad Pupovac, said today that "no solution" of the Yugoslav crisis is possible "without international arbitration". The SDF wishes to find the "minimal political consensus" between, on the one hand the Serbian Democratic Party which desires the annexation of the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" and part of Slavonia to Serbia and, on the other, the Croatian authorities.

"The great majority" of Serbs in Croatia "who do not live in the Krajina" are integrated into Croatian society and do not agree with the "methods" used by the Serbian politicians from the Krajina in order to achieve the political autonomy of Serbs in Croatia, said Pupovac.

At the press conference in Belgrade, Pupovac, who said that he was speaking "in the name of 400,000 to 500,000 Serbs in Croatia", added that he considered that there "was no good will at all" in Yugoslavia to solve the crisis peacefully.

Expressing his suspicion that "an even worse catastrophe in which neither Serbs nor Croats would be spared" could take place he said that the arbitration of the European, as well as the international community might have a decisive role.

Yugoslavia, according to Pupovac, "must be under the patronage of those who understand what danger today's Yugoslavia represents for the security of Europe".

Belgrade, October 17th, 1991
(AFP/HINA)

ral sciences and I thought that I had no competence to be a politician. I agreed only to take part as a volunteer in the work of the Committee for the Protection and the Promotion of Equality Rights of National Communities and Ethnic Groups founded by the Croatian Assembly which prepared documents in relation to the autonomy of the Serbs and other nationalities. Let me stress that the pursuit of a political career has never been the motive of my public commitment. All of us, whether Serbs or Croats, who sent contributions to the *Vjesnik* rubric entitled "The Readers Letters" were motivated by a wish that all misunderstandings be resolved on a democratic basis, by parliamentary means and by the usage of words and arguments instead of arms. Unfortunately, our warnings have been useless. Croatia is a victim of the war which was planned long ago under the pretext of the imminent threat to the Serbs.

It is because I am a Serb and because I love both the Serbian and the Croatian people that I am profoundly distressed by this war in which Croats are killed, their homes and memorable cultural monuments are destroyed but in which also Serbs die, blinded by their megalomaniac ideas or simply through the constellations of the circumstances imposed by the war. Finally, even if the idea of a Great Serbia were realizable, I am firmly convinced that it would not bring happiness to the Serbian population in Croatia.

This hard situation is greatly aggravated by the intervention of the Yugoslav army and the economic crisis which affected the whole of Yugoslavia but which hit Croatia especially hard as the war is waged on its territory. The withdrawal of the Yugoslav army out of Croatia and the departure of the Chetnik militants to Serbia might bring about the consolidation of peace in Croatia. All postponement of such moves is dangerous to all of us who consider the Republic of Croatia our homeland.

AN APPEAL FROM 43 NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS

Peace in Croatia

In a joint appeal 43 Nobel Prize winners from all parts of the world, addressed to governments in East and West, have requested a stop of the brutal action of the Yugoslav armed forces in Croatia. Simultaneously, the international relief organizations are requested to help all of the victims of this inconsiderate military assault.

"This undeclared war has already produced more than 2,000 dead and forced more than 100,000 people to flee. The violence and destruction unleashed in Croatia have reached a scale unknown in Europe since the Second World War," stands literally in the appeal. "Our conscience demands that we raise our voices against this senseless war. We appeal to all men and women to abandon their indifference to the plight of Croatian people: Croatia is not only facing the danger of total destruction of the country, but also the threat of their existence."

This unprecedented action - never before have so many awardees of the highest scientific distinction concurred on a common cause - was initiated by Professor Linus Pauling, of the Linus Pauling Institute of Science and Medicine, Palo Alto, USA (Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1954, Nobel Prize for Peace 1962), Professor Robert Huber, Max-Planck-Institut for Biochemistry, Martinsried/

Munnich (Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1988), and Professor Manfred Eigen, Max-Planck-Institut for biophysical Chemistry, Goettingen (Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1967).

"We cannot accept that in the middle of Europe innocent children, women and men are being killed, towns and villages in Croatia destroyed," explains Professor Huber. "We, at present 43, Nobel Prize winners from many countries, request by this peace appeal all the governments, humanitarian organizations, and all women and men to undertake all the necessary, to stop immediately murder in Croatia."

Further information is kindly offered by:

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Max-Planck-Institut for
Biochemistry
8033 Martinsried
Germany
Phone: (089) 857-82-677/8

Professor Manfred Eigen
Max-Planck-Institut for
Biophysical Chemistry
3400 Goettingen
Germany
Phone: (0551) 201-433









MESSAGE

During the past several months the war in Yugoslavia has caused much destruction and many deaths. The violence has affected innocent people as well. This war is most unfortunate and extremely sad particularly when the new found freedom in Eastern Europe should be celebrated. This senseless war must stop. I appeal to all to help bring this senseless war to an end. Violence must be avoided at all costs. Through violence no solution can be genuine or lasting. I also appeal to humanitarian organizations to come forward in providing aid to the victims of this war.

The Dalai Lama
Nobel Laureate 1989
(Peace)




THE DALAI LAMA

	Gerd Binnig Nobel Laureate 1986 (Physics)
	Daniel Nathans Nobel Laureate 1978 (Medicine)
	Baruj Benacerraf Nobel Laureate 1980 (Medicine)
	Paul Berg Nobel Laureate 1980 (Chemistry)
	Richard R. Ernst Nobel Laureate 1991 (Chemistry)
	Manfred Eigen Nobel Laureate 1967 (Chemistry)
	Severo Ochoa Nobel Laureate 1959 (Medicine)
	Milton Friedman Nobel Laureate 1976 (Economics)
	Hartmut Michel Nobel Laureate 1988 (Chemistry)
	Robert Schrieffer Nobel Laureate 1972 (Physics)
	Czeslaw Milosz Nobel Laureate 1980 (Literature)

with deep concern for justice
case, Erwin Hahn

Erwin Hahn
Nobel Laureate 1991
(Medicine)

Cesar Milstein
Nobel Laureate 1984
(Medicine)

Christian de Duve
Nobel Laureate 1974
(Medicine)

Johann Deisenhofer
Nobel Laureate 1988
(Chemistry)

James W. Cronin
Nobel Laureate 1980
(Physics)

C. Melitz
C. Melitz

Dallas, TX October 1991

James H. Brown

Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar

J. Steinberg

Wassily Kandinsky

Abbas Salam

Prof. T. Reichstein

Werner Arber

Heinrich Rohrer

Linus Pauling

William N. Lipscomb

Max F. Perutz

Robert H. L. Fisher

Jean Marie Lehn

Sununu Tonegawa

Georgiy K. Zhukov

Vladimir Prelog

Carlo José Cea

Mairiad Corrigan McGuire

Niels Jerne

P. G. de Gennes

Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin

Kenichi Fukui

Dagmar Tuohi

Jean Dausset

Lord Porter

Kai Siegbahn

Derek H. Barton

Call to any party involved in
the building a new apartment complex
in Dubrovnik

10/11/1991

Erwin Hahn

Cesar Milstein

Christian de Duve

Johann Deisenhofer

James W. Cronin

Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar

J. Steinberg

Wassily Kandinsky

Abbas Salam

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Jean Dausset


Lord Porter

Kai Siegbahn

Derek H. Barton

Call to any party involved in
the building a new apartment complex
in Dubrovnik

10/11/1991



Dubrovnik - The beautiful city, photo by Damir Fabijanic

EUROPE CANNOT BE BUILT ON DUBROVNIK'S RUINS

"I cried as if I'd been told about the death of a friend or about some immense catastrophe that had ruined the entire world" conceded the writer Jean d'Ormesson to the reading public of the leading French daily paper *Le Figaro*, when he heard that Dubrovnik, for him the most beautiful port in Europe, was threatened by war. As a member of the famous *Academie Francaise*, in a full newspaper page, he made a striking and touching appeal to the world to condemn this crime, which would, as he said, "disfigure Dubrovnik, and this would amount to a repetition of Guernica". He concluded that Europe cannot be built on Dubrovnik's ruins.

Jean d'Ormesson is only one in a long list of the world's prominent and renowned scientific and cultural figures who spoke in public against the unjust war in Croatia. They all expressed their sympathy for the suffering of the Croatian people, as well as their support of Croatian

fighting for a just cause. Academicians, movie stars, Nobel Prize and Oscar winners, University professors, writers, famous film and theatre directors and actors from all over Europe and America have been sending their letters, messages, appeals, protests and petitions.

All these public appearances in the media have one thing in common: all these people are horrified by the evil that has befallen this little European country of a millenial culture, vandalized only because it wants to be free and independent. All such reactions reflect a moral duty of intellectuals, who are always responsible for the spiritual image of the society they belong to.

Appeal from American intellectuals

Stop the destruction of Croatia, help the victims of Greater-Serbian military aggression, give support to peace in Croatia:

this is what the most prominent figures from the U.S. cultural circles said in an open letter published in *The New York Times*. The list of the signatories of their "Appeal for peace in Croatia" is really impressive. It includes two Nobel Prize winners, Milton Friedman (economist) and Czeslaw Milosz (writer), Oscar winner Meryl Streep, writer Kenneth Arrow, former Vice President of the USA Walter Mondale, Connecticut Congressman Bruce Morrison and McGeorge Bundy of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The appeal to "honest men and women to speak up against indifference and in favour of the Croatian people" was signed by professors from the largest American Universities: Bruce Ackerman, Guido Calabresi, Joseph Goldstein and Piotr Wandycz (Yale); Natalia Davis (Princeton); Istvan Deak (Columbia); Howard Hunter (Emory); Seymour Martin Lipset (George Mason); Myres Meryman (Stanford); George Palada

COUNCIL
OF EUROPE



CONSEIL
DEL'EUROPE

Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

9 October 1991
WDO213.2

Doc. 6513
2nd edition

WRITTEN DECLARATION No. 213
on the built and natural heritage of Croatia
(2nd edition)
(originally tabled on 24 September 1991)

The undersigned, members of the Assembly, 1. Profoundly concerned by the tragic war being waged in Yugoslavia; 2. Recalling that Croatia is an important region for the European cultural heritage in terms both of the natural environment and of architecture; 3. Concerned to learn that historic sites such as Vukovar, Osijek, Petrinja, Gospić, Kostajnica and the Plitvička Jezera National Park - which are part of the world's natural heritage - have been damaged; 4. Fearing the damage which might be inflicted on historic towns along the Adriatic coast such as Zadar, Split, Šibenik and Dubrovnik; 5. Appeal to the international community to do its utmost to put an end to hostilities; 6. Urge the Council of Europe, Unesco, Europa Nostra, Ecovast and all other organisations involved to take all requisite action to repair the damage to the Croatian cultural heritage as soon as the conflict ceases. Signed:

DIMMER
BERTI
JOHNSTON
CONCEICAO
HUNAUT
VERBEEK

SZELENYI
NEWALL
MÜLLER
PROBST
PARKANOVA
JUST

FAULDS
SPEED
GUSTAFSSON
RUBNER
NUNEZ
BOLINAGA

ESTEVE
DE PUIG
THOMPSON J.
BÜCHEL
SOELL
PARRY

BERG
ZAMMIT DIMECH
SHELTON
ARNALDS
HAGLUND
HARDY
GRAENITZ

28

World Jewish Congress, European Jewish
Organizations, Members of the World Jewish
and Institutions



Congress, National and International Jewish
Congress and all Affiliated Organizations

APPEAL TO OUR JEWISH BROTHERS AND SISTERS We, members of the Council of the Jewish Community in Zagreb, representatives of this two hundred years old Jewish Community and in the name of the another eight Jewish Communities in Croatia-Osijek, Rijeka, Split, Dubrovnik, Virovitica, Cakovec, Slavonski Brod and Daruvar that exist here for centuries,

note with sadness, dismay and indignation:

- that the Republic of Croatia whose citizens we are, is attacked by a brutal military force led by the Yugoslav National Army;
- that innocent civilian population is indiscriminately being killed by armed forces from the ground, from the air and from the sea and that by October, 7, 1991, at least 700 civilians were killed and at least 2000 wounded;
- that over two hundred thousand refugees had left their homes and everything they had achieved in their lives;
- that severe physical, psychological and economical suffering has been imposed on all citizens of Republic of Croatia regardless of their nationality, race, colour, creed or political belief;
- that, contrary to international humanitarian laws, these military forces are indiscriminately destroying hospitals, kindergartens, old aged homes, schools and other social care institutions;
- that hundreds of cultural and historical monuments of highest category, including churches, mosques, monasteries, libraries, cemeteries and Jewish monuments of culture are being heavily damaged or completely destroyed regardless of local or international laws and protection-the latest example is the city of Dubrovnik where the second oldest European synagogue stands;
- that the Jews in Croatia and their institutions, their communal and private property are equally suffering from the same threats and that the destroying of Croatia, its citizens and villages may bring to an end the history of this community living on this soil from the ancient times.

Furthermore, we record:

that the Jewish Community in Zagreb, after the antisemitic terrorist attack by a still unknown person or group on its Community Centre and cemetery on August 19, 1991, received a wide public support and expressions of compassion and outrage as well as needed practical support and protection, from our fellow-citizens, other religious communities, numerous political parties, public institutions, the Town Hall of Zagreb and the Government of Croatia;

that although the present Government of Croatia was deliberately depicted as antisemitic or neo-fascist, the Jewish Community in Croatia enjoys all rights of a religious or national minority without hinderance or any discrimination;

that the Government of Croatia publicly denounced and condemned all neo-fascist and extremist ideologies and organizations that threaten the democratic system in Croatia and its citizens and decided to undertake all necessary legal steps to prevent the spread of such dangers.

We express our fullest support to the efforts and declared policy of the Government of the Republic of Croatia of building a new democratic society in which human, political, civil national religious rights of every citizen and group will be protected.

We note with great sorrow that, due to the ongoing war, all our practical connections with our Jewish brothers and sisters in other Republics in Yugoslavia are broken and we express our deepest concern for their security and survival and we express our full solidarity with them as well.

We urge every person and institution in Yugoslavia that cherish human life, dignity and freedom to act against the aggression on the population and the Republic of Croatia and in any other part of Yugoslavia.

We specially call upon all our fraternal Jewish organizations and individuals around the world and the general public abroad to impress upon their governments and international organizations for a just and immediate peace in Croatia based on protection of human life.

We will never forget how our Jewish people was exterminated in the Second World War in front of the eyes of the whole world which observed our tragedy in silence and indifference. We don't want this tragic lesson of history to be repeated.

For the Council of the Jewish Community in Zagreb, Nenad Porges, President


(California); Richard Pipes and Henry Steiner (Harvard); W.V. Quine (Minnesota) and Eliot Stellar (Pennsylvania).

The American intellectuals have made it clear to the whole world who and why is attacking and destroying Croatia. They have called on the governments of the West to "stop the brutal aggression by the Yugoslav army" and made an appeal to all humanitarian organizations to help the victims of this violence. The renowned American poet Tess Gallagher joined this list and sent a letter to the U.S. Senate, saying among other things: "The most efficient way of checking the Serbian ambition of Greater Serbia would, of course, be to recognize Croatia and support its struggle for democracy and independence. This has in recent times been made especially difficult due to the grab-up of the Croatian territory and attacks on cities on the part of the federal army, secretly helped by Serbian rebels. I find it terribly ironical to read reports that refer to this nightmare as internal problems".

You are not alone

The European film workers have been particularly vocal, thus proving that all that is happening in Croatia most directly concerns the intellectual integrity of a united Europe. The world's famous German film director Volker Schlöndorff an Oscar winner, is horrified by the situation in Croatia. He is also concerned about Zagreb, to which he has been especially attached since he made his "Tin Drum" in the Croatian capital. His colleague Werner Herzog, who is also a renowned film and opera director, is very emotional about what has been happening in Croatia. His mother's family is of Croatian origin, so he has recently been adding their last name, Stipetić, to his own. "There is no doubt that the whole world knows that Croatia has been under attack and that the aggressor Yugoslav army takes the Serbian side", says Herzog. The famous film director, however, has no answer as to what has to be done. Only one thing is certain, he emphasizes. That is, "people have to do it".

"Do not close down your school" - said the Italian film director Ermanno Olmi in his



Design by Boris Ljubičić

message to the Zagreb Academy of performing Arts in sympathizing with the victims of the war, which has taken the lives of two Croatian cameramen, who had been students at that Academy. "We fully support your cause, which is just and sacred" - said Olmi to his Croatian colleagues. The same feelings and wishes were expressed by Lina Wertmüller, another famous Italian film director. The popular lady with the white glasses says: "I want you to know that you are not alone in your striving and that any time you can count on our sincere friendship. Let these words give you the courage to

keep up". The German film director Wim Wenders is desperate about the vandalism in Croatia, saying: "I can fully understand the Croatian people's need and decision to be independent at long last".

A great friend of Croatia, Polish film director Krzysztof Zanussi is sincerely moved by the war: "We Polish people have always been linked to the Western civilization, and this is why we feel close to Croatia. As an intellectual, I always take the side of those who are under attack, especially when it concerns a country so dear to us, Croatia". - These feelings were confirmed by a group of Polish writers and

Slavicists, including Julian Kornhauser, Waclaw Twardzik and Maria Dabrowska-Partyka, in a letter sent to the Zagreb and Belgrade media and literary journals.

Petition for the salvation of Dubrovnik

Alain Finkielkraut, French intellectual of Jewish origin, published his letter of protest in *Le Monde*. He says: "What is going on in Croatia is not at all a civil war, but a military invasion. Warships, MIGs, tanks and the force of weapons are only on one side, on the side of the *Federal Army*". He thinks that the media, in trying to be objective, are actually lulling people instead of informing them. "It should be noted that it is not two archaic, barbarian peoples that are fighting in the Balkans" - emphasizes the writer - "but an imperialistic power on the one hand and a people striving for freedom on the other, like in 1956 in Budapest or in 1968 in Prague".

The French "Appeal for peace in Croatia", signed among others by the writer Milan Kundera, historians Francois Furet, Marc Ferro and Jacques Le Goff, philosopher Georges Canguilhem and former Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, calls on the democratic world to "save a democracy and a people that are in danger". The attention of Britons will be drawn by the name of Judi Dench, the first lady of London theatre life, who signed the petition for the salvation of Dubrovnik, along with a lot of scientists and artists from the Isles.

In order to help Croatia with their authority and popularity in its justified fighting for peace and independence, a group of Hollywood actors, film directors, producers and screen-writers will gather in the Los Angeles home of the prominent American film producer Michael Winner at a *Meeting for Croatia*. Together with John Malkovich, an American actor of Croatian origin, Winner invited all those who worked on films and TV serials in Zagreb and Croatia. These include some fascinating names, such as Meryl Streep, George Scott, Richard Chamberlain, Telly Savallas, Michael Nader, Norman Jewison, William Hurt, Timothy Hutton, Jane Seymour, Robert Mitchum, Ernest Borgnine, Tom Selleck...

St. Vlaho - The fund for the salvation of Dubrovnik

To all those who can help Dubrovnik's salvation as well as its renovation, we would like to give the numbers of our accounts: Croatia Bank d.d. Zagreb: 30101-620-245-4-100-00039 a dinnar account and foreign exchange account: 100-727000-3-100-1531-4 For all informations please contact Croatia Bank, Slovenska 23, 41000 Zagreb, Croatia, fax/telephone: 41 57 37 37.

We shall keep track of all donators, and one day their names will thankfully be written into the history of Dubrovnik.

Petar Luznik
President

CARDINAL ALOJZIJE STEPINAC FUND TO REBUILD WAR- RAVAGED CROATIAN SHRINES

This fund was established on September 16, 1991, by artists, cultural and public workers, motivated by the human idea of rebuilding the war-ravaged shrines in all of the Republic of Croatia. SPONSOR of the Fund is His Eminence Franjo, Cardinal Kuharić, Archbishop of Zagreb which is the best testimony to the serious intent of this humanitarian enterprise. Fund's sources will be obtained through: benefit performances, concerts, auctions of paintings and other assistance by artists, contributions by founding and co-founding members and sponsors, fund-raising drivers, bequests, governmental and donation - and in other appropriate ways. The Fund has a dinar account with the Privredna Banka Zagreb (PBZ), numbered: 30 101-621-42-333; and foreign-exchange account with the Osterreichische Landerbank, Graz, No:760-127-380/00/200 (for US\$), 760-127-380/00/202 (for DM). We look forward to your participation in the realization of this fund. The Board of Trustees will recognize every contribution in appropriate manner.

CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEES Boris Buzančić

AD FOR ADS

To initiate collaboration with Croatian-Canadian businessmen and develop strategies such as marketing, management and financing and to implement new ideas/projects, we invite professionals to share their business expertise. Any professional business group or organization interested in placing an add in the bulletin, please call at 991-416-278-3002

EDITOR'S NOTE

I have reserved for myself the last word of all, the final assesment or summing up. This journal is dedicated for the good of our nation. I assume that this enterprise will be undertaken with the highest principle and the deepest thought.

Let me just say: I understand the value of it and the meaning of it. I do not want to advertise myself but it has got to be somebody who loves it and is prime to do it. I do not say I am the only one - surely not - but I am just saying there is one who can and is willing.

Here is a concept of an intellectual production on the serious matter of the Croatian tragedy today.

I was fortunate to get the help of many talented professors at the Department of Anglistics of the University of Zagreb, who provided me with informations, material and translations. Of the many people I talked to or corresponded with, I particularly want to mention: **Željka Čorak, Greta Pifat, Stijepo Miović Kočan, Janja Ciglar Žanić, Višnja Josipović, Stipe Botica, Željko Bujas, Mirjana Vidović Bohanec, Vesna Marčec Bell, Ivo Vidan, Višnja Sepčić, Vladimir Ivir, Nataša Jeffery.**

A superior designs by **Boris Bučan** and **Boris Ljubičić**, artwork by **Ivo Dulčić**, cartoons by **Otto Reisinger** and **Dinko Žibrat**, photographs by **Damir Fabijanic, Saša Novković** and photographers and journalists of "Večernji list" 's book "War crimes against Croatia", have been contributed to this journal.

In September 1991, "Večernji list" the largest circulation daily in Croatia, published the book "War crimes against Croatia", based on material gathered during the first two months of the war in Croatia. "Večernji list" photographers and journalists dedicated this book to all the people of the world as a document of these tragic times. I want to mention their names: **Erich and Tamara Ackermann, Jure Ilić, Dražen Ilinčić, Milan Jajčinović, Marc and Nataša Jeffery, Dorotea Jendrić, Branko Lovrić, Marijan Machala, Željko Pintar, Karlo Rosandić, Ivan Starčević** and **Željko Šojer.** I am grateful to the staff of the Information Service, University of Zagreb for their technical assistance.

Finally, my thanks to everybody for their generous help, encouragement and endurance to make this journal a success. R.O.S.

THANKS...

We would like to thank to all members of the association of the former students and friends of the Croatian universities, for the help in drugs and medical supplies as well as for the extended assistance in their intention to promote the truth about the war against our motherland Croatia.

Your help gives us strength to persist in our struggle for independent and free state Croatia.



Inga Depolo-Bučan,
co-ordinator
AMA Croatica, University of
Zagreb

MARGARET THATCHER: "WE CANNOT CONTINUE TO STAND BACK AND ALLOW THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, THE COMMUNIST SERBIAN GOVERNMENT AND SERBIAN TERRORISTS TO CRUSH THE PEOPLE OF CROATIA".

Margaret Thatcher, the well known and respected international politician and previous British Prime Minister is renown for her commitment to causes which she believes are just. ON THE 24th of Sept. 1991 she delivered an excellent speech to the 25 th Annual UN Ambassadors Dinner in New York, excerpts of which are reproduced on this page.

Only artificial states like Yugoslavia, created out of disparate nations subsequently held together by force and now by violence, are threatened by heightened national awareness.

Yugoslavia must rank as one of the world's least successful experiments in federalism - a fiercely contested distinction, at that!

For only ten of Yugoslavia's seventytwo years of existence has it known any kind of democracy. And it seems that, apart from the hardline communists, the only people who seriously wish to keep it as it is, are to be found outside its own borders.

THE DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

However, Yugoslavia is not only a lesson to the international community on the dangers of propping up artificially constructed federations of nations which wish to go their own way: it is also fast becoming a terrible and shameful lesson about our failure to act together to uphold human rights.

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Margaret Thatcher

We cannot continue to stand back and allow the Yugoslav army, the Communist Serbian government and Serbian terrorists to crush the people of Croatia. Croatian civilians are being murdered and mutilated. Refugees are pouring across the borders. Croatia's beautiful cities and ancient churches are being destroyed. Unless we give them hope - and help to defend themselves - they are lost.

The international community should remember three things.

First, the inherent right of self defence cannot be removed from those who are facing death and destruction. But they cannot exercise it without the means to do so.

Second, this is not just a struggle between national groups. It is one between Communists and those - the Croats - who seek democracy.

Third, it cannot just be considered as an internal matter for Yugoslavia. It goes far wider. It threatens international security. It is happening in the heart of Europe - and in an area where the interests of those directly involved are bound up with other minorities elsewhere and indeed other European sovereign states.

It is not for us to say that Croatia and Slovenia should remain in Yugoslavia against the democratically expressed wishes of their people. These two nations have exercised their right of secession under the Yugoslav Constitution.

In these circumstances, we should be prepared to apply the strictest possible economic sanctions against any republic which tries to change borders by force - and to provide the means of defence to the victims of aggression. I trust that the UN Security Council will take strong and urgent action to give practical effect to our shared resolve that democracy and human rights shall not perish.

If countries sign up to the international documents protecting human rights, they must be expected to observe them. And nothing does more to bring international declarations into disrepute - nothing does more to encourage would be aggressive dictators everywhere - than to regard such agreements as worth no more than the paper on which they are written.

And this leads me back to the second of my two conclusions - that we must be willing to take action in defence of human rights when these are trampled under foot by dictators.

The CSCE has an obvious role to play in this. The Charter of Paris, which I signed with other heads of Government last year, made particular mention of their rights of national minorities. We must give practical effect to the aspirations contained in that document.

But upholding human rights is not just a matter for the CSCE - it goes right to the heart of the purpose of the United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on 10th December 1948 refers to:

"The equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" to "life, liberty and security of person."

It does not just concern small and scattered minorities. It concerns individuals everywhere. It concerns whole nations. And it was our revulsion at Saddam Hussein's brutal treatment of the Kurdish people which prompted us to act vigorously to protect them from the Iraqi forces.



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The window of the St. Vlaho's Church, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 1971,
by Ivo Dulčić

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